Foreign Policy and Security Issues

Foreign Policy and Security Issues

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Institution

Introduction

Security has been one of the most fundamental pillars in any country. It is recognized as imperative for the sustainability, as well as continued growth of countries. Needless to say, recent times have seen an increase in security threats both within the national sphere and in the international arena. In most cases, security threats transcend boundaries of countries, states and regions. These security threats pose immense dangers on national stability especially considering that they have sophisticated weapons that can wreck havoc on the regions within which they undertake their acts. It goes without saying that taming these security threats necessitates that countries and regions collaborate so as to have make a united effort. While the 21st century has seen numerous security threats that demand international attention, none seems to have attained the magnitude or levels of the Iranian nuclear enrichment program.

The Iranian nuclear enrichment program was announced in 2009, when Tehran announced at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that it had a new uranium enrichment plant located at Fordow. Western Intelligence had detected this facility prior to the announcement. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) believes that the enrichment operations in the facility kicked off in December 2011. While Tehran has indicated that the facility will be used to enrich uranium for peaceful or rather civilian purposes, it is widely believed that Iran aims at enriching uranium in an effort to create an atomic bomb. It believes that the facility aims at enriching uranium beyond the 5% U- 235 concentration that has been attained in Natanz (Patrikarakos, 2012). In addition, the IAEA holds the belief that the facility has been undergoing further construction that is aimed at expanding its capacity so that it can ultimately accommodate over three thousand centrifuges. It is worth noting that the Fordow facility is significantly more protected than the facility in Natanz, in which case it stands considerably lower chances of being destroyed by missile or air strikes. The fears of the IAEA have been complemented by the fact that Iran flatly refused to cooperate with the nuclear inspectors from the United Nations, as well as the fact that it failed to make a timely disclosure of the existence of one mountain bunker named Fordo that undertakes the enrichment of uranium to high levels that are only a few technical steps away from becoming weapon-grade material (Patrikarakos, 2012). This poses an enormous threat to international security especially considering the magnitude of damage that an atomic bomb would create. It is, therefore, no surprise that the uranium enrichment program has attracted intense measures from the major powers that make up the so-called P5+1, that is the five permanent members of the United Nation’s Security Council (Russia, China, France, Britain, and the United States) plus Germany, all of which aim at bringing a closure to the nuclear enrichment facility and avert the threat that Iran poses on the security of the world at large (Patrikarakos, 2012).

There are varied key issues pertaining to the Iranian nuclear crisis. These are the things that have triggered the response of the five major powers especially the United States to the Iranian nuclear crisis. First, the United States stated that the Iranian government was a key state sponsor of terrorism. This label was based on the support that Tehran offers to radical Islamic groups such as Hamas in Palestinian territory and Hezbollah in Lebanon (Rogers, 2006). On the same note, the Iranian government has been accused of human rights abuses against its own people. This is especially in the 2009 presidential election where hundreds of thousands of Iranians participated in demonstrations against the government (Mousavian, 2011). Dozens were killed as the security forces cracked down on the demonstrators, and thousands taken to jail where the government admitted to torturing them. Secondly, the United States has in the past decade invaded and occupied Afghanistan and Iraq, both of which are Iran’s neighbors (Mousavian, 2011). The justification for the invasion of Iraq was claims that the Saddam Hussein was developing weapons of mass destruction, claims that were proven false with time (du Preez, 2006). As much as the invasion resulted in the deposing of Saddam and the installation of a new government, it also sparked violent insurgency that has resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands (Mousavian, 2011). The United States, among other major powers, has been cautioned against a similar action on Iran. However, these powers accuse Iran of offering support to the insurgency (du Preez, 2006). Third, policy makers have been concerned about the security of Israel. Israel leaders consider Iran as one of the most enormous threats to its security and existence especially considering that Iranian leaders have been extremely hostile to Israel and even stated their intention to extremely eliminate the country from the world map (Venter, 2005). In essence, there are real fears that Israel may take action against Iran aiming a eliminating the nuclear facilities of the country in case they feel that the United States and other major powers are taking too long or are too modest in their approach of the issue. Israel was unable to convince the major powers to set a red-line for the nuclear energy program in Iran. In essence, it changed its stance from a policy that pushes for the redlines with another one where it is giving Iran an ultimatum. These ultimatums are aimed at proving its effectiveness and asserting its authority in the entire region. Military actions or other violent attacks from Israel would undoubtedly force the United States, which has been a key ally of Israel to engage in a military conflict that has the potential of triggering a bigger regional war (Ottolenghi, 2010). The fourth issue revolves around the oil resources in the region. The major powers such as the United States have their economies closely tied to the oil resources flowing from the Persian Gulf, which is where Iran is located in the Middle East. Needless to say, these major powers have been undergoing economic and financial crisis, the recovery from which is highly dependent on the steady flow of the critical resource and in steady prices (Ottolenghi, 2010). Scholars have noted that an increase in the prices of oil would be likely to result in the worsening of the recession in the global economy (Delpech et al, 2007). Policy makers in the United States and its allies have, therefore, underlined the importance of taking into account the impact that policies targeting Iran would have on the continued flow of the critical resource from the Persian Gulf. The fifth issue revolves around the enormous transformation that is currently taking place in the Middle East. Democratic protests and demonstrations that have been termed as the Arab Spring have become a threat and even succeeding in toppling Middle Eastern leaders who have ruled for decades. A large number of these toppled leaders have been allies of the United States, as well as other major powers. There are ongoing sporadic demonstrations and protests in countries such as Bahrain and Syria (Patrikarakos, 2012). Other sporadic protests have been seen in Iran, but the security forces have been successful in repressing them quickly. Iran is a regional power in the Middle East, in which case it has been striving to extend its influence throughout the region in the course of the transformation or transition (Patrikarakos, 2012). In essence, it has become imperative that the United States and other major powers consider the effects that their policies and strategies in combating the Iranian nuclear crisis has on the increasingly unstable but still economically critical region as a whole.

Needless to say, these five issues have immense effect on the foreign policies of the United States, NATO and the European Union. These countries must consider the strategic nature of Iran especially with regard to the oil reserves from the Persian Gulf. Previous unilateral sanctions by the United States have triggered threats by Iran that it would close the Persian Gulf, in which case the all-crucial resource would not be available from the region (Chubin, 2006). It is worth noting that a third of the entire world’s oil passes through the Persian Gulf, in which case its closing would trigger an economic crisis in the entire world (Delpech et al, 2007). In addition, it is imperative that the major powers consider the strategic importance of Iran with regard to regional stability (Rogers, 2006). A large number of countries in the Middle East have been key allies of the United States and the European Union. Tehran, however, has been accused of funding terror groups in the region thereby threatening its stability (Chubin, 2006). In addition, the position of Tehran as a major power in the region means that the P5+1 have to undertake a balancing act as any action is likely to have enormous and reverberating effects on the world economy at large.

There have been numerous talks between Tehran and the P5+1 aimed at bringing the crisis to an amicable and diplomatic solution. The most recent one held on 5th April 2013 did not eliminate the standoff that exists between Iran and other major powers. In fact, Iran reiterated its right to enrich uranium (Rozen, 2013). It stated that before agreeing to suspend the 20% uranium enrichment program, the major powers must give assurances pertaining to a path that would lead to the recognition of its right to engage in uranium enrichment, as well as broader sanctions relief (Rozen, 2013).

While the impasse is not surprising, there have been predictions that the Iranian nuclear crisis is nearing a climax, which will be reaches by war or by compromise. However, war seems a bit overrated and unlikely. This is especially considering that the two sides are extremely comfortable with status quo rather than any other available alternative (Cordesman & Seitz, 2009). Tehran has not yielded on the sanctions and halt the enrichment programs, a stance that it is unlikely to change in the future. On the other hand, Washington prefers the current impasse to any military action against Iran. This would only change in case the Islamic Republic takes steps to build a nuclear weapon, a fact that Tehran is well conversant with and would want to avert (Cordesman & Seitz, 2009). While there is little likelihood that there will be a grand bargain between Iran and the major powers, each of the parties across the divide acknowledges the importance of compromise (Alter & Fishman, 2013). It is worth noting that the Iranian regime opines that it would gain more from the preservation of the status quo than agreeing to a deal that would essentially prevent it from having the capacity to quickly built nuclear weapons (Mousavian, 2011). Iran, by virtue of being encircled by U.S allies and wealthy Sunni monarchies, would rather subscribe to the partial nuclear deterrent than agree to the demands of the west (Alter & Fishman, 2013). On the same note, while Iran may have had its economy affected by the international sanctions, the Iranian regime does not seem to have been weakened in any way. In fact, the sanctions have been counterproductive in that Tehran has used them to justify tightening of the stranglehold on the Iranians (Mousavian, 2011). Moreover, the Iranian regime acknowledges from its past that economic self-interest usually wins against the will of the international community to maintain sanctions (Alexander & Hoenig, 2008). In essence, it is unlikely that multilateral sanctions will intensify in the future especially considering the increasing demand for energy in India and China, more so in case Tehran does not build nuclear weapons (Alexander & Hoenig, 2008). While the United States has intensified its military capacity in the Gulf (which could signal readiness to strike Iranian nuclear facilities) it is unlikely that it would go as far as using such mean. This is because it acknowledges that such actions would be likely to trigger an all-out war (Rogers, 2006). This can only change if there is clear indication that the Republic of Iran is building a nuclear bomb.

References

Alexander, Y., & Hoenig, M. M. (2008). The new Iranian leadership: Ahmadinejad, terrorism, nuclear ambition, and the Middle East. Westport, Conn: Praeger Security International.

Alter, B & Fishman, E (2013). Why the Iranian Nuclear Standoff Won’t End Anytime Soon. The Atlantic. Accessed 2nd May 2013 from HYPERLINK “http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/why-the-iranian-nuclear-standoff-wont-end-anytime-soon/274902/” http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/why-the-iranian-nuclear-standoff-wont-end-anytime-soon/274902/

Cordesman, A. H., & Seitz, A. C. (2009). Iranian weapons of mass destruction: The birth of a regional nuclear arms race?. Santa Barbara: Praeger Security International.

Chubin, S. (2006). Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Washington, D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Delpech, T., Schwartz, R., & Fondation nationale des sciences politiques. (2007). Iran and the bomb: The abdication of international responsibility. New York: Columbia University Press in association with the Centre d’études et de recherches internationales, Paris.

du Preez, J (2006). “Defusing The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Carrot and Stick Approach,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies

Mousavian , S.H(2011). The Iranian Nuclear Crisis. New York: Carnegie Endowment

Ottolenghi, E. (2010). Iran: The looming crisis : can the West live with Iran’s nuclear threat?. London: Profile.

Patrikarakos, D. (2012). Nuclear Iran: The birth of an atomic state. New York: Routledge

Rogers, P (2006) “Iraq, Afghanistan and now Iran Once Again,” Oxford Research Group

Rozen, L (2013). Setback at Iran nuclear talks. The back Channel. Accessed 2nd May 2013 from HYPERLINK “http://backchannel.al-monitor.com/index.php/2013/04/4945/setback-in-iran-nuclear-talks-western-officials-disappointed/” http://backchannel.al-monitor.com/index.php/2013/04/4945/setback-in-iran-nuclear-talks-western-officials-disappointed/

Venter, A. J. (2005). Iran’s nuclear option: Tehran’s quest for the atom bomb. Philadelphia: Casemate.