Effectiveness of IGAD’s Conflict Early Warning Mechanism (CEWARN)

By

William Nyawalo

……, Faculty Mentor and Chair

………………., Committee Member

…………Committee Member

…… Dean, School of Business

A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment Of the Requirements for the Masters Degree

In

International Conflict Management

ABSTRACTMany regions across the globe have highlighted the importance of conflict resolution as an imperative aspect of improving collaboration among countries and increase better ties among them so that they can concentrate on developmental issues. With the increased need for countries to have economic ties and avoid conflicts that might lead to disruption of good intentions, governments have come up with mechanisms that are meant to help in identifying possible conflicts early enough before they escalate and respond to them. CEWARN is one of the many early warning systems that have been established around the world to help in provision of conflict early warning alerts. This dissertation investigates the success of CEWARN as IGAD’s early conflict warning system. It focuses on the IGAD region and uses data provided by CEWARN and other external sources to carry out analysis to achieve the objectives. TABLE OF CONTENTS TOC o “1-3” h z u HYPERLINK l “_Toc368926545” ABSTRACT PAGEREF _Toc368926545 h 2

HYPERLINK l “_Toc368926546” TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGEREF _Toc368926546 h 3

HYPERLINK l “_Toc368926547” LIST OF ACRONYMNS AND ABBREVIATIONS PAGEREF _Toc368926547 h 4

HYPERLINK l “_Toc368926548” 1.0CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION PAGEREF _Toc368926548 h 5

HYPERLINK l “_Toc368926549” 1.1 Statement of the Research Problem PAGEREF _Toc368926549 h 5

HYPERLINK l “_Toc368926550” 1.2 Hypotheses PAGEREF _Toc368926550 h 8

HYPERLINK l “_Toc368926551” 1.3 Objectives of the study PAGEREF _Toc368926551 h 9

HYPERLINK l “_Toc368926552” 1.3.1 Specific Objective: PAGEREF _Toc368926552 h 9

HYPERLINK l “_Toc368926553” 1.3.2 Broad objectives: PAGEREF _Toc368926553 h 9

HYPERLINK l “_Toc368926554” 2.0CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL DISCUSSION PAGEREF _Toc368926554 h 10

HYPERLINK l “_Toc368926555” 2.1 Historical Background of CEWARN PAGEREF _Toc368926555 h 10

HYPERLINK l “_Toc368926556” 2.2 Typology of Crises and Conflicts in the IGAD Region PAGEREF _Toc368926556 h 11

HYPERLINK l “_Toc368926557” 2.2.1 Socio-Economic Underdevelopment PAGEREF _Toc368926557 h 12

HYPERLINK l “_Toc368926558” 2.2.2 Political Perspective PAGEREF _Toc368926558 h 13

HYPERLINK l “_Toc368926559” 3.0CHAPTER THREE: CASE STUDY- CEWARN PAGEREF _Toc368926559 h 15

HYPERLINK l “_Toc368926560” 3.1 Structure and functions of CEWARN PAGEREF _Toc368926560 h 15

HYPERLINK l “_Toc368926561” 4.0CHAPTER FOUR: CASE CRITIQUE PAGEREF _Toc368926561 h 18

HYPERLINK l “_Toc368926562” 4.1 CEWARN Success in Mitigation of Conflicts PAGEREF _Toc368926562 h 19

HYPERLINK l “_Toc368926563” 5.0CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION PAGEREF _Toc368926563 h 29

HYPERLINK l “_Toc368926564” 6.0BIBLIOGRAPHY PAGEREF _Toc368926564 h 32

LIST OF ACRONYMNS AND ABBREVIATIONSAPSA: African Peace and Security Architecture

AU: African Union

CEWARN: Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism

CEWS: Continental Early Warning System

CMD: Conflict Management Division

CEN-SAD: Community of Sahel-Saharan States

COMESA: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

ECCAS: Economic Community of Central African States

ECOWARN: ECOWAS Warning and Response Network

ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States

FAST: Fruhanalyse von Spannungen und Tatsachenermittlung

FEWER: Forum on Early Warning and Early Response

IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority on Development

MARAC: Central African Early Warning Mechanism

OAU: Organization of African Unity

OECD: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

OMC: Observation and Monitoring Centre

OSCE: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

PSC: Peace and Security Council

REC: Regional Economic Community

SADC: Southern Africa Development Community

WANEP: West Africa Network for Peace Building (WANEP) 1.0CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTIONThis section provides a background to the study and further provides a rationale for the study with a clear explanation of the objectives, research questions and philosophy. Where appropriate, the introductory chapter shall close with a guiding theoretical framework to offer a more specific support and basis for the current study. This chapter will be followed by literature review.

Conflict resolution is an important aspect of improving collaboration among countries and increase better ties among the countries so that they can concentrate on developmental issues. After the end of World War Two and the Cold War, conflicts in Africa mainly became to intrastate as opposed to the previous nature of wars, which was mostly interstate. The intrastate nature of wars has led to conflicts killing more civilians in African conflicts with the increased need for countries to have economic ties and avoid conflicts that might lead to disruption of good intentions, governments have come up with mechanisms that are meant to help in identifying possible conflicts early enough before they escalate and respond to them. These systems include CEWARN by IGAD, ECOWARN within ECOWAS and CEWS instituted by the African Union among other conflict early warning systems around the world. The importance of these systems in providing timely information that is accurate shows how the systems need to be very effective and efficient in their work. Therefore, on follow up to this, this proposal offers to undertake a study to evaluate the effectiveness of IGAD’s CEWARN conflict early warning system.

1.1 Statement of the Research ProblemAs seen by formation of conflict early warning system all around the world, there has been a growing interest in the desire to increase the effectiveness of conflict early warning systems so that conflicts are detected and managed early enough to prevent further escalation or halting of economic activities and increase conflict resolution as well as better international relations. This idea of putting a stop to wars through the use of early warning mechanism is not new to Africa even though Africa embraced the idea in the 1990s to improve effectiveness of its conflict resolution mechanisms and increase economic collaboration among states. Being an important constituent of conflict mitigation, conflict early warning is basically envisaged as the measures put in place aimed at avoiding or minimizing violence, deprivation or humanitarian crises that intimidate the sustainability of human development and livelihood. The success of these systems is therefore of paramount importance as it can be seen that they touch directly on international cooperation and conflict resolution which further touch on the issues of human development application of early warning in the realm of conflict prevention in the continent was started in the 1990s in line with a global trend in conflict management and resolution which espoused a preventive approach towards violent conflicts. Africa‘s very first attempt at establishing a conflict early warning unit was initiated in June 1992, “when the Organization of African Unity (OAU) decided to institute the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.” Whereas the OAU did not manage to establish a fully operational early warning system for a number of reasons to be explained at a later stage of this research, it has acquired due credit at least for starting the process of implementing conflict early warning at a continental level which was later pursued by its successor, the African Union. CEWARN is one of the two most advanced conflict early warning systems on the continent, the other one being ECOWARN by ECOWAS. CEWARN was established in 2002 by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) as IGAD’s early warning component. CEWARN is active among member states in the horn of Africa and these include Kenya, Uganda, Somalia, Djibouti, Southern Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea (Birikit, 2010). Arguably, it can be argued that IGAD traces its roots to 1986 with the establishment of the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) that was established with a primary objective of reacting to the recurring and severe droughts and other natural disasters in the Horn of Africa. When IGAD revitalized its mandate on development, peace and security, it found it reasonable to have an arm that would deal with timely detection of conflicts and attempt to deal with it in time. This was made possible by mandating CEWARN to receive and share information relating to prospectively violent conflicts as well as their outburst and escalation in the IGAD region. With all these efforts and determination IGAD has showed toward increasing effectiveness of dealing with conflicts in the region, one question that remains to be relevant is: how effective is the CEWARN in dealing with its mandated duties as an conflict early warning mechanism? The desire to explore this question further and attempt to provide an answer forms the philosophical foundation for this study.

Justification

The data collected from this study will expand the existing reports and findings on conflict resolution, peace and security in the IGAD’s region, which covers the Horn of Africa, the Nile Valley region and Great Lakes region in Africa. In addition to this, the study intends to explore factors influencing the decisions relating to flagging of a situation for possible conflict and any factors that may be a hindrance to effectiveness and efficiency of CEWARN as a conflict resolution and early warning system. As a mechanism instituted to be a conflict early warning and early response mechanism, CEWARN’s effectiveness can be evaluated from the perspective of how the analysis and recommendations it provides or delivers at different levels helps in effectively dealing with armed conflicts before they escalate into full-fledged wars.

With respect to academic control and public understanding, the study will:

Enhance knowledge and understanding about mandate and roles of conflict early warning mechanisms

Complement existing bodies of research on early warning systems as effective conflict resolution tools

Identify and discuss factors that lead to inefficiency and ineffectiveness in CEWARN system

Evaluate the correlation between conflict resolution and effective provision of early warning

Define and describe current dominant practices and processes of the CEWARN

Evaluate, through trend analysis, the historical performance of CEWARN as a conflict early warning system hence further evaluate its effectiveness and efficiency

At the policy level, it is hoped that the data gathered from the study will:

Recommend interventions designed to increase the efficiency of CEWARN in providing early warning and response mechanism

Will expand the existing reports and findings on conflict resolution, peace and security in the IGAD’s region, which covers the Horn of Africa, the Nile Valley region and Great Lakes region in Africa.

1.2 HypothesesBy undertaking the study, three hypotheses were set out for testing. The null hypotheses are:

H0: CEWARN has effectively helped in conflict mitigation through early warning mechanism

H0: Effective provision of early warning signals by CEWARN has a positive correlation with conflict resolution in the IGAD region of Africa

H0: Current and dominant practices and processes of the CEWARN are relevant to the needs of the IGAD region considering the dynamic nature of society and conflicts

1.3 Objectives of the studyThis study aims to investigate effectiveness of CEWARN in providing early warning signals for conflicts in the IGAD region. The following objectives are formulated to aid the study

1.3.1 Specific Objective:To investigate the effectiveness of CEWARN as a crisis early warning mechanism in the IGAD region

1.3.2 Broad objectives:To strengthen and help in further investigating the specific objectives, the following three broad objectives are also formulated to enhance the value of the study in achieving the intended purpose:

Evaluate, through trend analysis, the historical performance of CEWARN as a conflict early warning system hence further evaluate its effectiveness and efficiency

Evaluate the correlation between conflict resolution and effective provision of early warning

Define and describe current dominant practices and processes of the CEWARN with an aim of investigating possible ways of improving efficiency

2.0CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL DISCUSSION2.1 Historical Background of CEWARNCEWARN was established in 2002 by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) as IGAD’s early warning component. CEWARN is active among member states in the horn of Africa and these include Kenya, Uganda, Somalia, Djibouti, Southern Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea (Birikit, 2010).

The map below shows the region within which CEWARN has mandate; and which comprises the area of study that is basically the IGAD region.

2.2 Typology of Crises and Conflicts in the IGAD RegionConflict comprises perhaps the single greatest obstacle to economic and social progress in the IGAD region. The region has been enmeshed in never-ending wars for more than four decades and characterizes one of the most complex conflict systems in the world. It has been the site of several armed conflicts (both intra- and inter-state), severe environmental degradation, and general livelihood insecurity.

Indeed it has become routine to emphasize that “violent conflict disruptive of the state is prevalent in the Horn of Africa. The Horn of Africa has been faced with the same arbitrariness of borders inherited from the era of European colonial rule and with the inevitably consequential problems of state making and nation building among disparate peoples and in contested territory where there were cultural links with people across those borders. An example of this can be seen in the Northern parts of Kenya where there are Somali of Kenya origin and those of Somalia origin, as well as in the Northern parts of Tanzania where there are Masai of Kenyan origin and Masai of Tanzania origin. These features, found all over Africa and other ex-colonial territories, have been intensified by factors specific to the Horn, each of which further enhances the likelihood of internal and inter-state conflict. For instance an ethnically homogenous state, Somalia, whose nationalism embraced neighboring Somali minorities; Ethiopia with a territory that resulted from resistance to European colonialism but also from becoming an empire; Sudan straddling the cultural divide between Africa south of the Sahara and the north; are all a testimony of these features. There have recently been secessionist groups (that have continually created agitations for separate states) and these include Oromo secessionist group in Ethiopia, Mombasa Republican secessionist group in the Kenyan coast and the north-eastern secessionist group in the north-eastern parts of Kenya, among others in the region. The conflicts in this region take two broad perspectives: socio-economic perspective and political perspective.

2.2.1 Socio-Economic UnderdevelopmentOne of the sources of conflict in the region is socio-economic factors. The vast majority of the work force in IGAD countries is involved in agro-pastoral activities. Average rural production in the Horn of Africa amounts to 33.8 percent of the GDP of all countries in the IGAD region except Somalia and Djibouti. In comparison, the average rural production in industrialized countries lies between 1 and 2 percent of GDP. In Kenya, the poorest 20 percent of the population earns 5.0% of GDP, while the Graph is 6.6% for Uganda and averages 7.1% for Ethiopia. Similarly, large sections of the rural population in the region still depend on international food aid.

With importunate poverty; mixed with soaring population growth rates and marginalization of most of the small subsistence farmers and nomadic pastoralists, new socio-ecological aspects and dynamics put added pressure land regions that are sensitive to factors such as recurrent floods, droughts and degradation. This socio-ecological dimension of underdevelopment is more than a contributing factor to the political economy of wars in the area where nomadic pastoralists and subsistence farmers fight for scarce eco-zones.

Modes of rural production are also affected and determined by the divide between highland and lowland population as well as climatically and environmentally determined modes of rural production is a significant pattern throughout the Horn of Africa. Undesirable impacts on an increasingly fragile environment may in turn exacerbate structural heterogeneity within the countries in the IGAD region. For instance, through an additional decrease of historically already low productivity in the customary rural sector due to dilapidation of land, forest, and water resources structural heterogeneity is likely to be aggravated. Deterioration of the environment in the marginalized areas may also have damaging impacts on the modern sector if and when the latter depends on use of scarce renewable resources such as fresh water and fertile land for large-scale irrigation schemes and/or cash crop plantations.

The conventional rural sector in the region is most affected by mixed development. In the rural (subsistence) sector, dependence on natural capital per definition is extremely high. Degradation of poorly managed resources implies that the natural capital itself is shrinking and not building up. A combination of geographical constraints and poor state performance has numerous consequences. For instance, contending land-use and land-tenure systems bringing about complicated property rights, subdivision of already small plots causing excessive use of scarce land resources, over-centralization together with poorly developed sub-regional urban centers, insufficient off-farm opportunities, and high taxes intermixed with low capital investments causing a lack of financial participation in rural areas. Another key predicament of the past in most IGAD countries is undoubtedly the exceedingly high dependence of the economy on intervention by the central governments and this leads to failures in rural development if not of the state itself. As a result, socio-economic development gaps increase that lead to brewing social conflicts.

2.2.2 Political PerspectiveSocio-economic disparities, societal heterogeneity and geographical boundaries have cast a picture of insufficient or inefficient Integration and Cooperation hence making it difficult to create a stable regional security identity in the IGAD region. Culturally and historically speaking, various fault lines, which have effectively been politicized in the course of the last century, interlace the arena. One such line is the line between Arabic and Black Africa linked with lines between Muslim and Christian culture; the lines between highland and lowland cultures are often linked with ethno-political boundaries; the line between peasant cultures and nomadic pastoralism often relates to the other lines mentioned too.

There are political factors such as heavily conflicting structures of national governments and types of state constitutions, differing domestic policies, and self-seeking nationalist leaders who may set restrictions to regional effectiveness as well as underrating efforts for integration and cooperation (see, for example, the collapse of the East African Community in the 1970s). The informal but strong linkages of most of the Horn states with centers and powers external to the region has always been much stronger than the links among the IGAD countries themselves. Given the strategic geopolitical significance of the region comprising the Horn of Africa, as it provides a key spot from which to project power and provide rear-base support for military involvement in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, some of the countries in the IGAD region featured intrepidly in the superpower ideological rivalry and political engineering for strategic fortes of influence during the Cold War era. In more recent times, these links have included Sudan with Egypt and Libya; Somalia, Djibouti, and to a lesser extent Eritrea with the Arab Peninsula; and Kenya and Uganda with Southern and Central Africa and Southern Sudan with Sudan.3.0CHAPTER THREE: CASE STUDY- CEWARN3.1 Structure and functions of CEWARN1) The decision-making structures for CEWARN established under this Protocol are complementary to those already existing in IGAD.

2) The structure of CEWARN is established as follows:

The policy arm consisting of the Assembly, Council and Committee;

The administrative arm consisting of the Secretariat;

The technical arm consisting of: CEWARN Unit; CEWERUs.

The co-operating arms consist of: optional inter-state structures; optional sub-regional councils.

The coordinating arms consist of: The Committee of Permanent Secretaries established under Article 9 of this Protocol; The Committee on Early Warning (CEW).

Figure SEQ Figure * ARABIC 1: CEWARN’s Organizational Chart in Network Form

Functions of CEWARN

Functions of CEWARN are highlighted under Article 15 of the Supplementary Protocol and they cover both early warning and response and include the following:

a) Promote the exchange of information and collaboration among member states on early warning and response on the basis of the following principles:

Timeliness

Transparency

Cooperation

Free flow of information

b) Gather, verify, process arid analyze information about conflicts in the region according to the guidelines

c) Communicate all such information and analysis to decision makers.

d) More specifically, the early warning functions of CEWARN shall include:

Receiving information and reports from CEWERUs;

Processing and analyzing such information;

Bringing that information to the attention of the secretariat;

Providing the necessary feedback to the CEWERUs;

Disseminating such information as it is authorized, to those who are authorized, and in a manner that member states prescribe;

Updating and synthesizing information;

Setting standards;

Monitoring and coordinating information collection and reporting;

Promoting dialogue on information and analysis;

Networking among information gathering organizations;

Verifying information received from the CEWERUs.

4.0CHAPTER FOUR: CASE CRITIQUEThe effectiveness and success of the IGAD’s CEWARN can only be assessed and evaluated from the perspective of the mandates it has, some of which have been highlighted in the previous sections. From Article 14 of the Supplementary Protocol and with respect to conflict management, CEWARN is mandated to gather information, analyze and share it with member states. This implies that whether the projected will be averted depends on the actions of IGAD and the member countries. The success of IGAD’s CEWARN is also assessed with respect to Sudan and Somalia. While the IGAD region is generally a hotbed of conflicts, Somalia is a failed state and Sudan has had conflicts for a very long time until the secession of Southern Sudan to form an independent country. And the conflicts still continue between Sudan and Southern Sudan. Given that CEWARN is also mandated to generate options and develop case scenarios for response, then it would be logical to argue that the scenarios developed for Somalia and Sudan were not appropriate. Gathering and disseminating information on possibility of conflicts would be of no use if such information is not utilized to mitigate the wars or if the information provided is non-specific. Effectiveness and success of CEWARN is hampered by the constrained relations between IGAD members. As an example, after the Ethiopian, US-supported intervention into Somali, the UN gave authorization for an ‘IGAD and Member States of the African Union’ (IGASOM) to be sent to Somalia, which was never deployed. As an alternative, the AU authorized the African Union Mission in Somalia at the beginning of 2007 to stabilize the situation, to promote dialogue and reconciliation, to facilitate humanitarian assistance as well as reconstruction and development. However, by mid 2008, only 1,400 Ugandan soldiers of the 8,000 planned troops were deployed in Somalia. Other pledges have not been implemented in part due to a lack of funds. Even though other countries such as Ethiopia, Burundi and Kenya joined the Ugandan soldiers in Somalia, they are there by mandate of AU for AMISOM (The AU Mission in Somalia) and not IGAD. So an important question is whether CEWARN as an early conflict warning system triggers operational responses to qualify as successful.

4.1 CEWARN Success in Mitigation of ConflictsIt is understandable that the initial objective of establishing CEWARN by IGAD was to deal with drought and other natural disasters such as floods. Nevertheless, it is an undesirable coincidence that these aspects also comprise factors that contribute to armed conflict. CEWARN has been successful with respect to reporting drought projections and possible conflicts due to differing on use of land resources and water. Through its incident alerts and reports, CEWARN provides continuous reports and alerts on livestock theft where the incidences are mainly reported as cross-border incidences among the Karamoja Cluster in the Northern parts of Kenya and southern parts of Ethiopia. While the incident alerts and reports can be traced to several years back from the CEWARN documents (see attached documents in appendix), the CEWARN role seems to only be reduced to reporting as opposed to having a carefully set functional units established to help livestock recovery.

For instance, CEWARN reports (2011 report) indicated that droughts recorded in Ethiopia, Somalia and Northern Kenya had impacted the region severely by leading to depletion of ground water resources and pasture hence leading to loss of livestock. In addition, this led to food insecurity among the Karamoja and Somali Clusters thereby leading to a build up of tension, which is a major recipe for armed conflict and livestock theft. Despite the fact that these conditions are cyclical in nature in the region and the report indicates that livestock owners lose more than 35% of their livestock, the early warning organ has not found it reasonable to establish a fully-functional livestock recovery arm and peace-mediation effort. Nevertheless, it is notable that from analyzing available data, it is evident that CEWARN is successful in providing information that is actionable that which can elicit operational responses as seen from the fact that CEWARN alerts have successfully been acted upon in Ethiopia and Uganda to mitigate violence and achieve recovery of stolen livestock. The following is the trend analysis of the data available and how it has been utilized.

Graph 1: Incidents between 2005 and 2006 for Kenya Somali Cluster

While it can be seen from the graph above that between May 2005 and December 2006 the rate of incident occurrence can be seen to drop, Kenya is one of the countries that has not effectively utilized the CEWARN reports due to the fact while the alerts initially indicate a socio-economic development perspective, the interventions usually take a political dimension where the differing communities start accusing the intervening parties of being politically inclined to one side or another. The graph below shows the level of human deaths for the same period above.

Graph SEQ Figure * ARABIC 2: Graph of Human Deaths

As such, interventions have usually led to follow-up attacks in the form of retaliations. The graph clearly shows that either several incidences lead to another huge attack and death or an attack having huge impact on human leads to several attacks hence fewer deaths spread across the period as it is evident for periods May 2005- July 2005 and October 2006- December 2006 respectively. The graph below provides analysis of these reports and their successful use from 2008 to 2012

Graph SEQ Figure * ARABIC 3: CEWARN Alerts for Ethiopia

Pie Chart 1: Ethiopia’s Successful Use of CEWARN Alerts

Ethiopia has also exhibited a relative success in utilizing the information provided by CEWARN to successfully mitigate conflict escalation. In the CEWARN documents, the parties responsible for this achievement are mainly government officials in collaboration with community members from the affected communities. The report further indicates that the mediations usually entail holding people responsible, reconciliation and follow-up counseling. Probably it might explain why the country records fewer incidents.

Graph 4: CEWARN Alerts for Uganda

Pie Chart 2: Successful Use of CEWARN Alerts Uganda

The graph for Uganda showing how the CEWARN alerts are utilized shows that almost all the alerts are successfully utilized to achieve recovery or mitigation of conflict escalation. From the CEWARN documents, the parties that are responsible for utilizing this information and achieving the results showed include Brigade Intelligence Officers, DISO, DPC, Rapid Deployment Units, and CEWARN field officials among other parties in police.

Graph 5: CEWARN Alerts for Kenya

Pie Chart 3: Successful Use of CEWARN Alerts for Kenya

Graph 5 above shows how Kenya uses CEWARN alerts and to what extent of success alongside the pie chart that compares success rate in the use of the CEWARN alerts and reports. It should be clarified that the low rate of successful use of CEWARN alerts does not imply lack of responses. However, it implies that even though the alerts are acted upon the results often lead to less mitigation of future conflicts.

Graph 6: CEWARN Alerts for 4 of IGAD Countries

Graph 6 above provides a combined view of the three IGAD countries with respect to how successful they utilize the CEWARN early conflict warning alerts. Due to unavailability of data for all the period since the inception of CEWARN, it was not possible to carry out a comprehensive continuous trend analysis. Nevertheless, from the analysis it became obvious and imperative that for CEWARN to success, this success mainly depends on how the other parties utilize the information. For this reason, based on the three hypotheses set for investigation, which were the following:

H0: CEWARN has effectively helped in conflict mitigation through early warning mechanism

H0: Effective provision of early warning signals by CEWARN has a positive correlation with conflict resolution in the IGAD region of Africa

H0: Current and dominant practices and processes of the CEWARN are relevant to the needs of the IGAD region considering the dynamic natur