United Nations ability to prevent genocide

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Introduction

The world has known its fair share of wars and atrocities. In fact, the history of almost every other country in the globe is carved by wars, and in some cases genocide. However, never has the world experienced worse horrors as it did in the 20th century. The magnitude of violence has undergone evolution and even escalated, thanks to the advancement in technology. In the new war, civilians are on the receiving end, which is unlike in the past where wars pitted soldiers of different countries against one another. This new war was collectively given the term genocide by Raphael Lemkin in 1947 to underline the systematic and deliberate destruction, in part or whole, of a racial, national, religious or ethnic group. However, scholars have been having a hard time debating on what could sufficiently constitute a “part” so as to qualify the destruction as genocide (Andreopoulos, 13). Nevertheless, they note that it encompasses varied coordinated actions that aim at destroying the essential foundations of national groups’ life with the sole intention of annihilating these groups. Such a plan has the objective of disintegrating the social and political institutions of language, religion, culture, national feelings, as well as economic existence of these national groups, as well as the destruction of the personal liberty, dignity, lives, health and security of the people who belong to the groups. Raphael Lemkin stated that the genocide is not a new or contemporary phenomenon, rather it has been a fundamental component if civilization. However, he notes that the capacity of the international community more so the United Nations to prevent or intervene in it is relatively new. Scholars note that the prevention or even intervention in genocide was a fundamental component during the formation of the United Nations. Resolution 96 (1) of the United Nations established that the United Nations would prevent, as well as punish genocide. In addition, this clause was a resolution of the member nations to draft the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. It is well understood that, during the cold war years, the United Nations could do nothing as it was entangled in the cold war politics. However, it is worth noting that the Security Council of the UN incorporates the capacity to implement the necessary measures so as to maintain security and peace in the international community. Questions emerge on whether international bodies in general and especially the United Nations (UN) are capable of preventing or even stoping the occurence of genocide. As varied scholars and observers note, the United Nations has been incredibly unable to intervene and stop the occurrence of genocide (Andreopoulos, 34). Volumes of literature have been written to this effect reviewing what went wrong in past genocides, as well as the capacity or the ability of the United Nations to intervene and prevent genocides. While many scholars acknowledge that the United Nations stands out as the best hope for intervention and prevention of genocide, there is widespread agreement that the international body is unable to prevent or intervene in genocides.

Thesis statement: The United Nations is incapable of intervening or preventing genocides.

Since the formation of the United Nations in 1945 after the World War II, there have occurred a total of 55 genocides and political wars, which have claimed the lives of more than 75 people. This is undoubtedly more than has been claimed by wars. The United Nations took steps to prevent and punish perpetrators of genocide during the Genocide Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Organizers of Genocide. The Genocide Convention was arguably the most fundamental step that the United Nations took in an effort to prevent the occurrence of genocide or guide its intervention during genocide. It defined the term genocide and categorized it as a crime in international law, with the parties pledging to prevent, as well as punish it. Punishment would be meted on perpetrators, conspirers, as well as individuals who incite, attempt to or even exhibit complicity in genocide, irrespective of their position in the society. Suspects of such crimes, according to the Genocide Convention, were to undergo trial by a competent tribunal set up in the country where they carried out the acts or even by an international penal tribunal that has jurisdiction (http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/UN-GENO.asp). These crimes were not to be categorized as political crimes, according to the Genocide Convention. On the same note, it is worth noting that the United Nations, via the Security Council can kick up varied measures in an effort to maintain international peace and stability.

While the United Nations may have these powers, it is worth noting that it does not incorporate a standing army. This international body does not constitute a military organization. The willingness and legitimacy of deploying missions or troops that would prevent the occurrence of conflict has its roots in the universal membership, the Security Council, as well as the UN Charter. While this may be the case, it is noteworthy that the deficiency of a standing army means that the UN’s capacity to intervene in conflicts is incredibly hampered. This is because nations take time before they can agree on risking the lives of their people, the financiers of such efforts, or even who would be leading the charge. This was seen in the case of Rwandan genocide in April 1994. As General Dallaire in the Carnegie Report, as few as 5000 troops could have been enough to prevent the occurrence of genocide in Rwanda (Dorn and Matloff, 23). It is noted that General Dallaire had prior information about the arming and training of Hutu militia in weaponry so that they can engage in the extermination and annihilation of their Tutsi tribesmen, as well as Hutu moderates. Unfortunately, the UN peacekeepers were poorly equipped and had, in fact, had some of them withdrawn from the country. As the Carnegie Report notes, countries were reluctant to commit their peacekeepers to the provision of support for the offensive force that General Dallaire was vouching for, for varied reasons. The United States was unwilling to commit its soldier to this cause after the Somalia incident, especially considering the likely casualty levels, as well as the political impact of such actions on the involved countries (Dorn and Matloff, 24). Belgium, on the other hand, had resolved to withdraw its soldiers from Rwanda after losing 10 of them. Other key countries such as Canada and France were also unwilling to send their soldiers as it was understood that irrespective of their edge in firepower, they would still be likely to lose a number of their troops, losses that few countries were willing to tolerate. In essence, despite the fact that the United Nations could call for such intervention, its lack of standing military means that it still has to rely on countries especially major powers, which immensely undermines its capacity to intervene or prevent genocide.

On the same note, as much as the UN is quite operational, its peace operations do not have proper equipment for the prevention of or even intervention in large-scale violence propagated against civilians. This equipment is in terms of personnel, finance, as well as arms. As noted earlier, the UN is unable to organize, deploy, as well as manage military operations in a comprehensive and rapid manner. Even in instances where the United Nations manages to convince countries to deploy some of their troops, scholars note that the troops are quite different as far as their training is concerned, or even the equipment that they are using in such missions (Dorn and Matloff, 25). These factors limit the capacity of the missions to function in the hostile environments. Moreover, Ludlow (17) notes that the United Nations troops called in to Rwanda had been advised to use force only in self defense and not to take any enforcement action. This stipulation that emphasizes on self defense during, according to Ludlow  (23), is a direct avoidance at stipulating outright intervention in the genocide that was taking place.

In addition, as much as the United Nations may be an international entity and even incorporate some avenues of preventing or at least intervening in genocides, it is not a truly independent entity. Gold (35) notes that the United Nations’ Security Council addresses the political motives, as well as strategic interests of the permanent members especially in humanitarian intervention. He cites the case of Kuwaiti, which the Security Council was quick to protect thanks to their oil, unlike the case of  Rwandan genocide where the Security Council took time before declaring it “genocide” or even calling for military intervention as Rwanda does not have as many resources (Gold, 36). These sentiments are also echoed by Farrell (13) who christens the United Nations as an agency or a large bureaucracy that is made up of numerous, jealously-guarded fiefdoms, with special interest groups and an extended hierarchy of stakeholders dominating each of the fiefdoms. According to Farrell, the interest groups have a claim to the UN’s resources, which is determined by a sophisticated set of agency and power relationships rather that the principles of subsidiarity and solidarity (17). In essence, as much as the United Nations may have varied strategies that it can use to intervene or prevent genocide, it still suffers from lack of independence as its resources or even its intervention efforts are controlled by the special interest groups, as well as the five permanent members. This lack of autonomy and total control was also shown in Rwanda. As Kentish (16) notes, General Romeo Dallaire had recommended that he be allowed to jam the broadcasting stations as they were being used to incite the Hutu against the Tutsi, as well as call for their extermination. However, the United States declined this request stating that such an option or action would be a breach of constitutional commitment to free speech (Kentish 16). As (Krain, 6) notes, the Security Council’s authority is mostly vetoed against by the powerful nations especially when their interests are not met, thereby crippling the institution’s capacity. This raises questions about the independence or autonomous nature of the institution, which evidently shows that as much as it has the power to take varied measures, it does not have the capacity to undertake them without the authority or at least the assistance of certain countries.

Moreover, the very nature of the United Nations cripples its ability to intervene in or prevent the occurrence of genocides. This is especially considering that the member states are considered autonomous and sovereign. Genocide is not a war that pits nations against each other, rather it comes in the form of civil war or an internal affair. As Merkel (16) notes, the United Nations was established in an effort to continue cooperation and communication between nations rather than solve world problems more so within nations. In essence, the creation of the United Nations has, therefore, seen a decrease in wars between nations with civil wars increasing tremendously. Its activities are usually limited to those actions that are not seen as a violation of the sovereignty of the countries involved (Totten and Bartrop, 23). This explains why its intervention in the Rwandan genocide was limited to humanitarian intervention, services that aimed at assisting civilian populations that may not be taking part in the conflict. In most cases, however, humanitarian assistance comes short of preventing the occurrence of genocide as seen in the case of Rwanda. The killing of the ten soldiers from Belgium may have resulted from the fact that the soldiers were not allowed to use force unless they were defending themselves. The use of force, however, comes as a necessity in the case of genocide as shown by the French soldiers who intervened in the genocide and helped in halting and even eliminating it (Totten and Bartrop, 26). Unfortunately, the United Nations is recognized as a neutral institution, a feature that would be considerably watered down if it involved itself in a country’s local politics as would be the case in case of a forceful, military intervention.

However, Totten and Bartrop (26) opine that the United Nations should not be entirely blamed for the mistakes that have been done in the past in relation to Kosovo, Kuwaiti and Rwanda. Instead, they lay the blame on other countries and especially the key powers noting that they veto the Security Council’s authority in instances where they feel that their interests are not threatened. They note that, in the case of Rwanda, the only successful intervention was by the French soldiers, an operation that was known as Operation Turquoise (Totten and Bartrop, 27). This was an indication that the genocide could have been prevented if only the powerful countries had the political will to do it. It is noteworthy that the French was only intervening due to their vested interests in the country. While this assertion abdicates the UN from blame, it also raises questions on its ability to act on its own and serves as a confirmation as to its inability to prevent or intervene in such atrocities.

In conclusion, there have been quite a large number of genocides in the contemporary human society. This has been worsened by technological innovation, which has taken warfare to an entirely new level. However, since the formation of the United Nations, there has been a decrease in wars between nations but an increase in wars within nations. This has taken the form of genocide, defined as the deliberate annihilation and extermination of a certain group of people distinguished by tribe, religion, color, language and culture among other features. Questions have arisen on whether the U.N has the capacity to prevent and intervene in genocides. It is evident that the United Nations has been ineffective in doing this. As much as this international body has various tools that it could use to prevent or intervene in genocides, it faces some structural and institutional obstacles. It does not have a standing army, in which case even its humanitarian efforts are deeply hindered. In addition, it seems to be captive of varied major countries in which case its involved in the power play of these countries. The resources that it has at its disposal are determined by the powerful nations, which almost always act only if their interests are met. In addition, the formation of the United Nations was based on the need for international peace, with its legitimacy being derived from its ability to remain neutral. This image is likely to be eliminated in case it involves itself in the local politics of a country as envisioned by genocide. There are also issues of a country’s sovereignty which cannot be violated especially for independent countries. In addition, it does not have a standard approach to genocide in which case even in instances where it chooses to intervene, it takes too long due to logistics on who would provide the troops, financing or leadership during a military intervention. In essence, despite its capacity to instigate diplomatic, economic, military and political sanctions, the United Nations is incapable of preventing or intervening sufficiently in genocides.

Annotated Bibliography

Modern History Sourcebook: UN Resolution 260, 1948 – On Genocide: CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE. United Nations Treaties Series. No. 1021, vol. 78 (1951), p. 277. Retrieved 23rd January 2013 from HYPERLINK “http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/UN-GENO.asp” http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/UN-GENO.asp

This internet source provides outlines of the provisions of the United Nations in Geneva Conventions. It also outlines the resolutions that the countries that were members of the United Nations made pertaining to genocide and defines the actions that would be termed as genocide.

Totten, Samuel and Bartrop, Paul R. The United Nations and genocide: Prevention, intervention, and prosecution. Human Rights Review July–September 2004, Volume 5, Issue 4, pp 8-31

The writers note that the United Nations, until recently, has not come close to fulfilling its mandate, which is articulated or spelt out in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. In fact, it has rarely implemented Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter so as to physically intervene in order to stop conflicts or counter the threats to peace. Totten and Bartrop opine that the United Nations has mainly focused on balancing the interests of the great powers that control it.

Gold, Dore. Tower of Babble: How the United Nations Has Fueled Global Chaos. New York: Three Rivers Press, 2005. Print

Gold, in this book criticizes the United Nations for its moral relativism. He examines why the United Nations has not been intervening and blames the major powers who he says hold the organization captive. He accuses the council of addressing only the political motives and strategic interests of its five permanent members more so during humanitarian interventions. He notes, for instance, that the council protected the Kuwaitis due to their oil, while giving poor protection to the resource-poor Rwandans during the 1994 genocide.

Ludlow, D.R.L Humanitarian Intervention and the Rwandan Genocide. Journal of conflict Studies. Volume XIX, No. 1 Spring 1999. Print

Ludlow also examines the capacity of the United Nations to intervene or prevent genocide with his main focus being the Rwandan genocide of 1994. He states that the intervention of the United Nations was inadequate and restricted to humanitarian intervention. This resource also chronicles the events of the genocide, outlining the efforts that the UN made before, during and after the genocide and bringing to the fore the failing of the institution.

Kentish, Lucy. ‘Genocide Prevention in the Modern Setting: Theory versus Practice’. Internet Journal of Criminology, 2011. Print

Kentish examines the various genocides that have occurred in the contemporary world, not to mention the role that the United Nations has played in preventing their occurrence or even halting them. The journal outlines the reasons and the occurrence of genocides in Serbia and Rwanda among other countries. It outlines the failings of the United Nations during the Rwandan genocide examining their basis or reason.

Merkel, Bernard-Alexandre. The Rwandan Genocide: The Guilty Bystanders. E-international relations, 2010. Retrieved 23rd January 2013 from HYPERLINK “http://www.e-ir.info/2010/01/14/the-rwandan-genocide-the-guilty-bystanders/” http://www.e-ir.info/2010/01/14/the-rwandan-genocide-the-guilty-bystanders/

This resource examines the inability of the United Nations to intervene in case of genocides through the lens of Rwandan genocide. He examines why the nature of the United Nations hinders it from fulfilling its mandate. While the institution may be credited with reducing wars between nations, it is unable to reduce civil wars or even genocides mainly because these are internal wars.

Farrell, Michael L. The Genocide in Rwanda and the Structural Limitations of the Secular Human Rights Movement. Social Justice Review VOL. 100, No. 11-12 November-December, 2009. Print

The author does acknowledge that the United Nations and the entire international community are incapable of intervening or preventing genocides. The author christens the United Nations as an agency or the powerful nations, in which case it is entangled in doing their bidding. The author brings to the fore the power relations that affect the ability of the institution to execute its duties, as well as its manpower limitations.

Krain, Mathew. Atrocity Interrupted: How Intervention Mandate, Magnitude and Mission Sponsor Affect the Severity of Genocide or Politicide. International Studies Association, San Diego, California, 2006. Print

Krain acknowledges that the United Nations occupies an advantaged position that states do not have as far as intervention in genocides is concerned. He examines why the United Nations is better placed to intervene than states, as well as the limitations that it faces in executing such duties. He cites administrative limitations, lack of financial assistance, bureaucratic politics and the different interests of countries among others as the key reasons. He notes that the United Nations is still a captive of its member states especially powerful countries whose bidding it tries to balance (6).

Dorn, A. Walter and Matloff, Jonathan. Preventing the Bloodbath: Could the UN have Predicted and Prevented the Rwandan Genocide? The Journal of Conflict Studies. Volume XX, No. 1 Spring 2000

This resource examines the capability of the United Nations to stop genocide with specific focus on the Rwandan case. It chronicles the occurrence of the Rwandan genocide, as well as how the UN peacekeepers handled it. It also examines incorporates some information on the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide especially the Carnegie Report.

Works cited

Andreopoulos, George J. Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions. Philadelphia, Pa: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1997. Print.

Totten, Samuel and Bartrop, Paul R. The United Nations and genocide: Prevention, intervention, and prosecution. Human Rights Review July–September 2004, Volume 5, Issue 4, pp 8-31

Gold, Dore. Tower of Babble: How the United Nations Has Fueled Global Chaos. New York: Three Rivers Press, 2005. Print

Ludlow, D.R.L Humanitarian Intervention and the Rwandan Genocide. Journal of conflict Studies. Volume XIX, No. 1 Spring 1999. Print

Kentish, Lucy. ‘Genocide Prevention in the Modern Setting: Theory versus Practice’. Internet Journal of Criminology, 2011. Print

Merkel, Bernard-Alexandre. The Rwandan Genocide: The Guilty Bystanders. E-international relations, 2010. Retrieved 23rd January 2013 from HYPERLINK “http://www.e-ir.info/2010/01/14/the-rwandan-genocide-the-guilty-bystanders/” http://www.e-ir.info/2010/01/14/the-rwandan-genocide-the-guilty-bystanders/

Farrell, Michael L. The Genocide in Rwanda and the Structural Limitations of the Secular Human Rights Movement. Social Justice Review VOL. 100, No. 11-12 November-December, 2009. Print

Dorn, A. Walter and Matloff, Jonathan. Preventing the Bloodbath: Could the UN have Predicted and Prevented the Rwandan Genocide? The Journal of Conflict Studies. Volume XX, No. 1 Spring 2000

Krain, Mathew. Atrocity Interrupted: How Intervention Mandate, Magnitude and Mission Sponsor Affect the Severity of Genocide or Politicide. International Studies Association, San Diego, California, 2006. Print