UNITED STATES,
UNITED STATES, Petitioner v. Humberto ALVAREZ-MACHAIN.
504 U.S. 655 (112 S.Ct. 2188, 119 L.Ed.2d 441)
UNITED STATES, Petitioner v. Humberto ALVAREZ-MACHAIN.
No. 91-712.
Argued: April 1, 1992.
Decided: June 15, 1992.
Syllabus
Respondent, a citizen and resident of Mexico, was forcibly kidnapped from his home and flown by private plane to Texas, where he was arrested for his participation in the kidnapping and murder of a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent and the agent’s pilot. After concluding that DEA agents were responsible for the abduction, the District Court dismissed the indictment on the ground that it violated the Extradition Treaty between the United States and Mexico (Extradition Treaty or Treaty), and ordered respondent’s repatriation. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Based on one of its prior decisions, the court found that, since the United States had authorized the abduction and since the Mexican government had protested the Treaty violation, jurisdiction was improper.
Held: The fact of respondent’s forcible abduction does not prohibit his trial in a United States court for violations of this country’s criminal laws. Pp. 659-670.
(a) A defendant may not be prosecuted in violation of the terms of an extradition treaty. United States v. Rauscher, HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/119/407” o “119 U.S. 407, 7 S.Ct. 234, 30 L.Ed. 425” 119 U.S. 407, 7 S.Ct. 234, 30 L.Ed. 425. However, when a treaty has not been invoked, a court may properly exercise jurisdiction even though the defendant’s presence is procured by means of a forcible abduction. Ker v. Illinois, HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/119/436” o “119 U.S. 436, 7 S.Ct. 225, 30 L.Ed. 421” 119 U.S. 436, 7 S.Ct. 225, 30 L.Ed. 421. Thus, if the Extradition Treaty does not prohibit respondent’s abduction, the rule of Ker applies and jurisdiction was proper. Pp. 659-662.
(b) Neither the Treaty’s language nor the history of negotiations and practice under it supports the proposition that it prohibits abductions outside of its terms. The Treaty says nothing about either country refraining from forcibly abducting people from the other’s territory or the consequences if an abduction occurs. In addition, although the Mexican government was made aware of the Ker doctrine as early as 1906, and language to curtail Ker was drafted as early as 1935, the Treaty’s current version contains no such clause. Pp. 663-666.
(c) General principles of international law provide no basis for interpreting the Treaty to include an implied term prohibiting international abductions. It would go beyond established precedent and practice to draw such an inference from the Treaty based on respondent’s argument that abductions are so clearly prohibited in international law that there was no reason to include the prohibition in the Treaty itself. It was the practice of nations with regard to extradition treaties that formed the basis for this Court’s decision in Rauscher, supra, to imply a term in the extradition treaty between the United States and England. Respondent’s argument, however, would require a much larger inferential leap with only the most general of international law principles to support it. While respondent may be correct that his abduction was “shocking” and in violation of general international law principles, the decision whether he should be returned to Mexico, as a matter outside the Treaty, is a matter for the Executive Branch. Pp. 666-670.
946 F.2d 1466 (CA9 1991), reversed and remanded.
REHNQUIST, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN and O’CONNOR, JJ., joined.
Kenneth W. Starr, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.
Paul Hoffman, Los Angeles, Cal., Robert K. Steinberg, Los Angeles, Cal., of counsel, for respondent.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case is whether a criminal defendant, abducted to the United States from a nation with which it has an extradition treaty, thereby acquires a defense to the jurisdiction of this country’s courts. We hold that he does not, and that he may be tried in federal district court for violations of the criminal law of the United States.
Respondent, Humberto Alvarez-Machain, is a citizen and resident of Mexico. He was indicted for participating in the kidnap and murder of United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) special agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar and a Mexican pilot working with Camarena, Alfredo Zavala-Avelar. HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/504/655” l “fn1” 1 The DEA believes that respondent, a medical doctor, participated in the murder by prolonging agent Camarena’s life so that others could further torture and interrogate him. On April 2, 1990, respondent was forcibly kidnapped from his medical office in Guadalajara, Mexico, to be flown by private plane to El Paso, Texas, where he was arrested by DEA officials. The District Court concluded that DEA agents were responsible for respondent’s abduction, although they were not personally involved in it. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F.Supp. 599, 602-604, 609 (CD Cal.1990). HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/504/655” l “fn2” 2Respondent moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming that his abduction constituted outrageous governmental conduct, and that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to try him because he was abducted in violation of the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico. Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, 1979 United States-United Mexican States, 31 U.S.T. 5059, T.I.A.S. No. 9656 (Extradition Treaty or Treaty). The District Court rejected the outrageous governmental conduct claim, but held that it lacked jurisdiction to try respondent because his abduction violated the Extradition Treaty. The district court discharged respondent and ordered that he be repatriated to Mexico. Caro-Quintero, supra, at 614.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the indictment and the repatriation of respondent, relying on its decision in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (CA9 1991), cert. pending, No. 91-670. 946 F.2d 1466 (1991). In Verdugo, the Court of Appeals held that the forcible abduction of a Mexican national with the authorization or participation of the United States violated the Extradition Treaty between the United States and Mexico. HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/504/655” l “fn3” 3 Although the Treaty does not expressly prohibit such abductions, the Court of Appeals held that the “purpose” of the Treaty was violated by a forcible abduction, 939 F.2d, at 1350, which, along with a formal protest by the offended nation, would give a defendant the right to invoke the Treaty violation to defeat jurisdiction of the district court to try him. HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/504/655” l “fn4” 4 The Court of Appeals further held that the proper remedy for such a violation would be dismissal of the indictment and repatriation of the defendant to Mexico.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s finding that the United States had authorized the abduction of respondent, and that letters from the Mexican government to the United States government served as an official protest of the Treaty violation. Therefore, the Court of Appeals ordered that the indictment against respondent be dismissed and that respondent be repatriated to Mexico. 946 F.2d, at 1467. We granted certiorari, 502 U.S. —-, 112 S.Ct. 857, 116 L.Ed.2d 766 (1992), and now reverse.
Although we have never before addressed the precise issue raised in the present case, we have previously considered proceedings in claimed violation of an extradition treaty, and proceedings against a defendant brought before a court by means of a forcible abduction. We addressed the former issue in United States v. Rauscher, HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/119/407” o “119 U.S. 407, 7 S.Ct. 234, 30 L.Ed. 425 (1886)” 119 U.S. 407, 7 S.Ct. 234, 30 L.Ed. 425 (1886); more precisely, the issue of whether the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842, 8 Stat. 572, 576, which governed extraditions between England and the United States, prohibited the prosecution of defendant Rauscher for a crime other than the crime for which he had been extradited. Whether this prohibition, known as the doctrine of specialty, was an intended part of the treaty had been disputed between the two nations for some time. Rauscher, HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/119/0” o “119 U.S., at 411, 7 S.Ct., at 236” 119 U.S., at 411, 7 S.Ct., at 236. Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the Court, which carefully examined the terms and history of the treaty; the practice of nations in regards to extradition treaties; the case law from the states; and the writings of commentators, and reached the following conclusion:
“A person who has been brought within the jurisdiction of the court by virtue of proceedings under an extradition treaty, can only be tried for one of the offences described in that treaty, and for the offence with which he is charged in the proceedings for his extradition, until a reasonable time and opportunity have been given him, after his release or trial upon such charge, to return to the country from whose asylum he had been forcibly taken under those proceedings.” Id., at 430, 7 S.Ct., at 246 (emphasis added).
In addition, Justice Miller’s opinion noted that any doubt as to this interpretation was put to rest by two federal statutes which imposed the doctrine of specialty upon extradition treaties to which the United States was a party. Id., at 423, 7 S.Ct., at 242. HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/504/655” l “fn5” 5 Unlike the case before us today, the defendant in Rauscher had been brought to the United States by way of an extradition treaty; there was no issue of a forcible abduction.
In Ker v. Illinois, HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/119/436” o “119 U.S. 436, 7 S.Ct. 225, 30 L.Ed. 421 (1886)” 119 U.S. 436, 7 S.Ct. 225, 30 L.Ed. 421 (1886), also written by Justice Miller and decided the same day as Rauscher, we addressed the issue of a defendant brought before the court by way of a forcible abduction. Frederick Ker had been tried and convicted in an Illinois court for larceny; his presence before the court was procured by means of forcible abduction from Peru. A messenger was sent to Lima with the proper warrant to demand Ker by virtue of the extradition treaty between Peru and the United States. The messenger, however, disdained reliance on the treaty processes, and instead forcibly kidnapped Ker and brought him to the United States. HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/504/655” l “fn6” 6 We distinguished Ker’s case from Rauscher, on the basis that Ker was not brought into the United States by virtue of the extradition treaty between the United States and Peru, and rejected Ker’s argument that he had a right under the extradition treaty to be returned to this country only in accordance with its terms. HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/504/655” l “fn7” 7 We rejected Ker’s due process argument more broadly, holding in line with “the highest authorities” that “such forcible abduction is no sufficient reason why the party should not answer when brought within the jurisdiction of the court which has the right to try him for such an offence, and presents no valid objection to his trial in such court.” Ker, supra, at 444, 7 S.Ct., at 229.
In Frisbie v. Collins, HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/342/519” o “342 U.S. 519, 72 S.Ct. 509, 96 L.Ed. 541” 342 U.S. 519, 72 S.Ct. 509, 96 L.Ed. 541, rehearing denied, HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/343/937” o “343 U.S. 937, 72 S.Ct. 768, 96 L.Ed. 1344 (1952)” 343 U.S. 937, 72 S.Ct. 768, 96 L.Ed. 1344 (1952), we applied the rule in Ker to a case in which the defendant had been kidnapped in Chicago by Michigan officers and brought to trial in Michigan. We upheld the conviction over objections based on the due process clause and the Federal Kidnapping Act and stated:
“This Court has never departed from the rule announced in Ker that the power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court’s jurisdiction by reason of a ‘forcible abduction.’ No persuasive reasons are now presented to justify overruling this line of cases. They rest on the sound basis that due process of law is satisfied when one present in court is convicted of crime after having been fairly apprized of the charges against him and after a fair trial in accordance with constitutional procedural safeguards. There is nothing in the Constitution that requires a court to permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice because he was brought to trial against his will.” Frisbie, supra, at 522, 72 S.Ct., at 511-512 (citation and footnote omitted). HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/504/655” l “fn8” 8The only differences between Ker and the present case are that Ker was decided on the premise that there was no governmental involvement in the abduction, HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/119/0” o “119 U.S., at 443, 7 S.Ct., at 229” 119 U.S., at 443, 7 S.Ct., at 229; and Peru, from which Ker was abducted, did not object to his prosecution. HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/504/655” l “fn9” 9Respondent finds these differences to be dispositive, as did the Court of Appeals in Verdugo, 939 F.2d, at 1346, contending that they show that respondent’s prosecution, like the prosecution of Rauscher, violates the implied terms of a valid extradition treaty. The Government, on the other hand, argues that Rauscher stands as an “exception” to the rule in Ker only when an extradition treaty is invoked, and the terms of the treaty provide that its breach will limit the jurisdiction of a court. Brief for United States 17. Therefore, our first inquiry must be whether the abduction of respondent from Mexico violated the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico. If we conclude that the Treaty does not prohibit respondent’s abduction, the rule in Ker applies, and the court need not inquire as to how respondent came before it.
In construing a treaty, as in construing a statute, we first look to its terms to determine its meaning. Air France v. Saks, HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/470/392” o “470 U.S. 392, 397, 105 S.Ct. 1338, 1341, 84 L.Ed.2d 289 (1985)” 470 U.S. 392, 397, 105 S.Ct. 1338, 1341, 84 L.Ed.2d 289 (1985); Valentine v. United States ex. rel. Neidecker, HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/299/5” o “299 U.S. 5, 11, 57 S.Ct. 100, 103, 81 L.Ed. 5 (1936)” 299 U.S. 5, 11, 57 S.Ct. 100, 103, 81 L.Ed. 5 (1936). The Treaty says nothing about the obligations of the United States and Mexico to refrain from forcible abductions of people from the territory of the other nation, or the consequences under the Treaty if such an abduction occurs. Respondent submits that Article 22(1) of the Treaty which states that it “shall apply to offenses specified in Article 2 including murder committed before and after this Treaty enters into force,” 31 U.S.T., at 5073-5074, evidences an intent to make application of the Treaty mandatory for those offenses. However, the more natural conclusion is that Article 22 was included to ensure that the Treaty was applied to extraditions requested after the Treaty went into force, regardless of when the crime of extradition occurred. HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/504/655” l “fn10” 10More critical to respondent’s argument is Article 9 of the Treaty which provides:
“1. Neither Contracting Party shall be bound to deliver up its own nationals, but the executive authority of the requested Party shall, if not prevented by the laws of that Party, have the power to deliver them up if, in its discretion, it be deemed proper to do so.
“2. If extradition is not granted pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, the requested Party shall submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, provided that Party has jurisdiction over the offense.” Id., at 5065.
According to respondent, Article 9 embodies the terms of the bargain which the United States struck: if the United States wishes to prosecute a Mexican national, it may request that individual’s extradition. Upon a request from the United States, Mexico may either extradite the individual, or submit the case to the proper authorities for prosecution in Mexico. In this way, respondent reasons, each nation preserved its right to choose whether its nationals would be tried in its own courts or by the courts of the other nation. This preservation of rights would be frustrated if either nation were free to abduct nationals of the other nation for the purposes of prosecution. More broadly, respondent reasons, as did the Court of Appeals, that all the processes and restrictions on the obligation to extradite established by the Treaty would make no sense if either nation were free to resort to forcible kidnapping to gain the presence of an individual for prosecution in a manner not contemplated by the Treaty. Verdugo, supra, at 1350.
We do not read the Treaty in such a fashion. Article 9 does not purport to specify the only way in which one country may gain custody of a national of the other country for the purposes of prosecution. In the absence of an extradition treaty, nations are under no obligation to surrender those in their country to foreign authorities for prosecution. Rauscher, HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/119/0” o “119 U.S., at 411-412, 7 S.Ct. at 236” 119 U.S., at 411-412, 7 S.Ct. at 236; Factor v. Laubenheimer, HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/290/276” o “290 U.S. 276, 287, 54 S.Ct. 191, 193, 78 L.Ed. 315 (1933)” 290 U.S. 276, 287, 54 S.Ct. 191, 193, 78 L.Ed. 315 (1933); cf. Valentine v. United States ex. rel. Neidecker, supra, HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/299/0” o “299 U.S., at 8-9, 57 S.Ct., at 102” 299 U.S., at 8-9, 57 S.Ct., at 102 (United States may not extradite a citizen in the absence of a statute or treaty obligation). Extradition treaties exist so as to impose mutual obligations to surrender individuals in certain defined sets of circumstances, following established procedures. See 1 J. Moore, A Treatise on Extradition and Interstate Rendition, § 72 (1891). The Treaty thus provides a mechanism which would not otherwise exist, requiring, under certain circumstances, the United States and Mexico to extradite individuals to the other country, and establishing the procedures to be followed when the Treaty is invoked.
The history of negotiation and practice under the Treaty also fails to show that abductions outside of the Treaty constitute a violation of the Treaty. As the Solicitor General notes, the Mexican government was made aware, as early as 1906, of the Ker doctrine, and the United States’ position that it applied to forcible abductions made outside of the terms of the United States-Mexico extradition treaty. HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/504/655” l “fn11” 11 Nonetheless, the current version of the Treaty, signed in 1978, does not attempt to establish a rule that would in any way curtail the effect of Ker. HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/504/655” l “fn12” 12 Moreover, although language which would grant individuals exactly the right sought by respondent had been considered and drafted as early as 1935 by a prominent group of legal scholars sponsored by the faculty of Harvard Law School, no such clause appears in the current treaty. HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/504/655” l “fn13” 13Thus, the language of the Treaty, in the context of its history, does not support the proposition that the Treaty prohibits abductions outside of its terms. The remaining question, therefore, is whether the Treaty should be interpreted so as to include an implied term prohibiting prosecution where the defendant’s presence is obtained by means other than those established by the Treaty. See Valentine, HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/299/0” o “299 U.S., at 17, 57 S.Ct., at 106” 299 U.S., at 17, 57 S.Ct., at 106 (“Strictly the question is not whether there had been a uniform practical construction denying the power, but whether the power had been so clearly recognized that the grant should be implied”).
Respondent contends that the Treaty must be interpreted against the backdrop of customary international law, and that international abductions are “so clearly prohibited in international law” that there was no reason to include such a clause in the Treaty itself. Brief for Respondent 11. The international censure of international abductions is further evidenced, according to respondent, by the United Nations Charter and the Charter of the Organization of American States. Id., at 17, 57 S.Ct., at 106. Respondent does not argue that these sources of international law provide an independent basis for the right respondent asserts not to be tried in the United States, but rather that they should inform the interpretation of the Treaty terms.
The Court of Appeals deemed it essential, in order for the individual defendant to assert a right under the Treaty, that the affected foreign government had registered a protest. Verdugo, 939 F.2d, at 1357 (“in the kidnapping case there must be a formal protest from the offended government after the kidnapping”). Respondent agrees that the right exercised by the individual is derivative of the nation’s right under the Treaty, since nations are authorized, notwithstanding the terms of an extradition treaty, to voluntarily render an individual to the other country on terms completely outside of those provided in the Treaty. The formal protest, therefore, ensures that the “offended” nation actually objects to the abduction and has not in some way voluntarily rendered the individual for prosecution. Thus the Extradition Treaty only prohibits gaining the defendant’s presence by means other than those set forth in the Treaty when the nation from which the defendant was abducted objects.
This argument seems to us inconsistent with the remainder of respondent’s argument. The Extradition Treaty has the force of law, and if, as respondent asserts, it is self-executing, it would appear that a court must enforce it on behalf of an individual regardless of the offensiveness of the practice of one nation to the other nation. In Rauscher, the Court noted that Great Britain had taken the position in other cases that the Webster-Ashburton Treaty included the doctrine of specialty, but no importance was attached to whether or not Great Britain had protested the prosecution of Rauscher for the crime of cruel and unusual punishment as opposed to murder.
More fundamentally, the difficulty with the support respondent garners from international law is that none of it relates to the practice of nations in relation to extradition treaties. In Rauscher, we implied a term in the Webster-Ashburton Treaty because of the practice of nations with regard to extradition treaties. In the instant case, respondent would imply terms in the extradition treaty from the practice of nations with regards to international law more generally. HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/504/655” l “fn14” 14 Respondent would have us find that the Treaty acts as a prohibition against a violation of the general principle of international law that one government may not “exercise its police power in the territory of another state.” Brief for Respondent 16. There are many actions which could be taken by a nation that would violate this principle, including waging war, but it cannot seriously be contended an invasion of the United States by Mexico would violate the terms of the extradition treaty between the two nations. HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/504/655” l “fn15” 15In sum, to infer from this Treaty and its terms that it prohibits all means of gaining the presence of an individual outside of its terms goes beyond established precedent and practice. In Rauscher, the implication of a doctrine of specialty into the terms of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty which, by its terms, required the presentation of evidence establishing probable cause of the crime of extradition before extradition was required, was a small step to take. By contrast, to imply from the terms of this Treaty that it prohibits obtaining the presence of an individual by means outside of the procedures the Treaty establishes requires a much larger inferential leap, with only the most general of international law principles to support it. The general principles cited by respondent simply fail to persuade us that we should imply in the United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty a term prohibiting international abductions.
Respondent and his amici may be correct that respondent’s abduction was “shocking,” Tr. of Oral Arg. 40, and that it may be in violation of general international law principles. Mexico has protested the abduction of respondent through diplomatic notes, App. 33-38, and the decision of whether respondent should be returned to Mexico, as a matter outside of the Treaty, is a matter for the Executive Branch. HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/504/655” l “fn16” 16 We conclude, however, that respondent’s abduction was not in violation of the Extradition Treaty between the United States and Mexico, and therefore the rule of Ker v. Illinois is fully applicable to this case. The fact of respondent’s forcible abduction does not therefore prohibit his trial in a court in the United States for violations of the criminal laws of the United States.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice BLACKMUN and Justice O’CONNOR join, dissenting.
The Court correctly observes that this case raises a question of first impression. See ante, at 659. The case is unique for several reasons. It does not involve an ordinary abduction by a private kidnaper, or bounty hunter, as in Ker v. Illinois, HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/119/436” o “119 U.S. 436, 7 S.Ct. 225, 30 L.Ed. 421 (1886)” 119 U.S. 436, 7 S.Ct. 225, 30 L.Ed. 421 (1886); nor does it involve the apprehension of an American fugitive who committed a crime in one State and sought asylum in another, as in Frisbie v. Collins, HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/342/519” o “342 U.S. 519, 72 S.Ct. 509, 96 L.Ed. 541 (1952)” 342 U.S. 519, 72 S.Ct. 509, 96 L.Ed. 541 (1952). Rather, it involves this country’s abduction of another country’s citizen; it also involves a violation of the territorial integrity of that other country, with which this country has signed an extradition treaty.
A Mexican citizen was kidnaped in Mexico and charged with a crime committed in Mexico; his offense allegedly violated both Mexican and American law. Mexico has formally demanded on at least two separate occasions HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/504/655” l “fn1-1” 1 that he be returned to Mexico and has represented that he will be prosecuted and punished for his alleged offense. HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/504/655” l “fn2-1” 2 It is clear that Mexico’s demand must be honored if this official abduction violated the 1978 Extradition Treaty between the United States and Mexico. In my opinion, a fair reading of the treaty in light of our decision in United States v. Rauscher, HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/119/407” o “119 U.S. 407, 7 S.Ct. 234, 30 L.Ed. 425 (1886)” 119 U.S. 407, 7 S.Ct. 234, 30 L.Ed. 425 (1886), and applicable principles of international law, leads inexorably to the conclusion that the District Court, United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F.Supp. 599 (CD Cal.1990), and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 946 F.2d 1466 (1991) (per curiam ), correctly construed that instrument.
* The Extradition Treaty with Mexico HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/504/655” l “fn3-1” 3 is a comprehensive document containing 23 articles and an appendix listing the extraditable offenses covered by the agreement. The parties announced their purpose in the preamble: The two Governments desire “to cooperate more closely in the fight against crime and, to this end, to mutually render better assistance in matters of extradition.” HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/504/655” l “fn4-1” 4 From the preamble, through the description of the parties’ obligations with respect to offenses committed within as well as beyond the territory of a requesting party, HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/504/655” l “fn5-1” 5 the delineation of the procedures and evidentiary requirements for extradition, HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/504/655” l “fn6-1” 6 the special provisions for political offenses and capital punishment, HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/504/655” l “fn7-1” 7 and other details, the Treaty appears to have been designed to cover the entire subject of extradition. Thus, Article 22, entitled “Scope of Application” states that the “Treaty shall apply to offenses specified in Article 2 committed before and after this Treaty enters into force,” and Article 2 directs that “extradition shall take place, subject to this Treaty, for willful acts which fall within any of the extraditable offenses listed in the clauses of the Appendix.” HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/504/655” l “fn8-1” 8 Moreover, as noted by the Court, ante, at 663, Article 9 expressly provides that neither Contracting Party is bound to deliver up its own nationals, although it may do so in its discretion, but if it does not do so, it “shall submit the case to its competent authorities for purposes of prosecution.” HYPERLINK “http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/504/655” l “fn9-1” 9Petitioner’s claim that the Treaty is not exclusive, but permits forcible governmental kidnaping, would transform these, and other, provisions into little more than verbiage. For example, provisions requiring “sufficient” evidence to grant extradition (Art. 3), withholding extradition for political or military offenses (Art. 5), withholding extradition when the person sought has already been tried (Art. 6), withholding extradition when the statute of limitations for the crime has lapsed (Art. 7), and granting the requested State discretion to refuse to extradite an individual who would face the death penalty in the requesting country (Art. 8), would serve little purpose if the requesting country could simply kidnap the person. As the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized in a related case, “each of these provisions would be utterly frustrated if a kidnapping were held to be a permissible course of governmental conduct.” United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1349 (1991). In addition, all of these provisions “only make sense if they are understood as requiring each treaty signatory to comply with those procedures whenever it wishes to obtain jurisdiction over an individual who is located in another treaty nation.” Id., at 1351.
It is true, as the Court notes, that there is no express promise by either party to refrain from forcible abductions in the territory of the other Nation. See ante, at 664,665-666. R
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