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United Parcel Service

United Parcel Service 

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Introduction

In to modern world competitive business environment planning is critical. However, the traditional forecast-based planning and budget-oriented planning are inadequate to meet the survival needs of a large corporation such as UPS. Therefore, UPS must engage in strategic planning, which properly defines its objectives and examines both its internal and external dynamics to conjure a strategy, implement it, monitor its progress and effect necessary adjustments to stay on course. UPS is now over 100 years old and perfectly understands the package delivery business which has been its domain since its inception (Levy, 2002). Over the 100 years the company has expanded and it currently serve customer In more than 200 countries. Over the course of its existence the company has had to embrace modern technology and change in order to keep abreast with its competitors. For instance the company had to investigate and adopt e-comerce to facilitate online transactions (About UPS, 2012a). I also had to redefine it main business and get new ways to enhance its organization and process this reinventing itself in order to take advantage of new opportunities. No doubt, a strong approach to strategic plan played a crucial role on the reinventions and improvement the firm had conducted from time to time. Strong approach to strategic planning has resulted in a strong corporate strategy and direction.

UPS Strategic Plan

UPS strategic plan is geared toward ensuring that the firm has global dominance in delivering parcels worldwide. This is clearly evident in the organizations performance in the last two decades. In the 1990s the firm, “grew from a $14 billion package delivery company to a $30 billion global enterprise” (Ross, et al, 2002). The services provided by the company services in that include international shipping, financial services, logistics and other related services About UPS., (2012b). The organization strategic plan had been purely facilitating global commerce characterized by movement of capital, information and physical goods. As the world ushered in the 21st century UPS was busy realigning its strategic plan to focus on supply chains and get deeply intertwined into the supply chains o f their customers. Alongside this move is to reduce the amount of the money spend on moving good along the supply chain and also enhance the efficiency of the supply chains.

This strategy further benefited from adoption of information technology. IT has brought about numerous efficiencies to the core competencies of the firm and created new countless opportunities for adjoining lines of business. The adjoining or adjacent businesses are a critical part of the company’s strategic plan. Most of the adjacent businesses are subsidiaries of UPS. This strategy and the organizations corporate organization have helped it to develop numerous small-scale ventures which have also been successful and some have been upgraded to subsidiaries of the firm (Ross, et al, 2002).

This strategic plan can be summarized as exploring opportunities with the major aim being to take advantage of the market size (Levy, 2002). Whenever a market is attractive, adjacent to UPS and complimentary to is corporate strategy, “to facilitate global commerce,” the firm makes the best of it. However, if the market does not meet these criteria it is overlooked.

The company’s strategic plan has also been instrumental in its exploitation of markets outside the US. In its strategic plan, the expansion to markets outside use takes a shift from the organic growth model the business has employed for decades. UPS opts for a partnering and acquisition strategy. This strategy has been executed in many countries in two phases. The first phase involved country-to-country delivery services through regional partners and acquisition of regional delivery companies. The next phase involved purchase of local companies in other countries to facilitate delivery of packages. UPS subsequently came up with multiple channels through which it could reach its customers. As e result, it was easier for the customer to schedule deliveries and pick-ups (Opidee et al. n.d.). IT was the icing on the cake. With the adoption of IT deliveries have been improved and customers are able to track their goods using mobile devices.

UPS Corporate strategy and direction

A corporate strategy entails mastering control of the core competencies or a firm or organization in order to realize predefined highly strategic objectives. The corporate strategy further involves decision-making and analytic procedure concerned with what to offer (such as goods and services), when to offer, (business cycles, timing among others) and the place to offer (such as market niches) as a competitive plan (United Parcel Service of America, 2005). UPS corporate strategy is concerned with the overall direction the organization wants to go, where as its strategic plan constitutes the activities UPS intends to undertake in order to pursue the corporate strategy and direction (Reynolds, 2009). The firm corporate strategy is to facilitate global business.

In America the firm has developed several delivery networks and has 1,748 operating facility. It also has 152,500 delivery vehicles which include vans, cars and tractor-trailers. It also owns 283 aircrafts. It employs 359000 employees.

According to Garvin & Levesque (2006) In delivery of the packages the firm uses a “hub and spoke” system, whereby the company owns region hubs, which work as sorting facilities and exchange points for packages in their regions. The hubs are designed to handle thousands of packages per hour to facilitate redirecting and delivery of the packages to respective operating centers. From operating centers, the package can be delivered to the door of the recipients (Byrne, n.d.). Also an employee can pick package form the door steps of a sender and deliver it to the operational center where it is sent to the hub then redirected to the recipients nearest operating center (Ross, et al, 2002).

Outside America the firm uses subsidiaries and partners to reach is customers. The subsidiaries are designed to operate the way the main firm operates in America in areas where the firm has no subsidiaries or its subsidiaries have a problem accessing packages are given to local partner firms to take them to their final destination.

Growth direction it truly aimed at facilitating global business, its business strategy. Garvin & Levesque (2006) Observed that the firm has enhanced its services through additional service extensions, development of countless channels to enhance accessibility of the customers. Customers can also prearrange pickup and monitor the movement of their packages through UPS call centers (Boulton, 1999). The firm further provides the customers with electronic and web connection to shipping firm for the purposes of tracking the movement of their packages. With these services the customers can monitor the movement of goods on the phones and PDAs. UPS integrations into the customers supply chains is also shaping its corporate strategy (Levy, 2002). It is now forging alliances with software companies like Oracle and SAP develop interfaces for UPS functionality in its emporium systems. UPS has also optimized its operational ground transport networks both on land and air to deliver packages in a cost effective manner. Operations have also been automated in many areas to increases efficiency.

Conclusion

In conclusion strategic plans are important to the realization of the corporate strategy. UPS strategic plan targets expansion to facilitate global business. The strategic plan and corporate goals have been responsible for the expansion of the firm domestically and internationally. The company has a proper physical operational strategy that facilitates actual distribution of goods through “hub and spoke”.

References

About UPS. (2012a). Retrieved from HYPERLINK “http://www.ups.com/content/us/en/about/index.html” http://www.ups.com/content/us/en/about/index.html

About UPS. (2012b)Welcome to UPS Supply Chain Solutions. http://www.ups-scs.com/

Boulton, W. R. (1999).United Parcel Service: Moving at the Speed of Business. Retrieved from http://www.auburn.edu/~boultwr/UPS_Case.PDF

Byrne, J. A. (n.d.). Strategic Planning: After a decade of gritty downsizing, Big Thinkers are back in corporate vogue. Retrieved from

Garvin, D. A., & Levesque, L. C. (2006). Strategic Planning at United Parcel Service. Harvard Business Schoo

Levy, M. (2002). Case Study: United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS). Retrieved from HYPERLINK “http://www.peachpit.com/articles/article.aspx?p=20881” http://www.peachpit.com/articles/article.aspx?p=20881

Opidee et al. (n.d.).United Parcel Service. Presentation retrieved from http://supernet.isenberg.umass.edu/visuals/ups_final.pdf

Reynolds, G. (2009). Information Technology for Managers. Boston, Mass.: Cengage Course Technology

Ross, et al. (2002). United Parcel Services: Business Transformation through Information Technology. CISR Working Paper No. 331

United Parcel Service of America. (2005) Supply Chain Strategy: The Importance of Aligning Your Strategies. Retrieved from http://www.ups-scs.com/solutions/white_papers/wp_supply_chain.pdf

United Nations

United Nations

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After the end of the world war one, the league of nation was formed to maintain world peace and security. However, it was inactive in its role and seized activity in the world war two after which the United Nations was formed to maintain peace using the same tactics as the League of Nations, United Nations however was focused on improving the peacekeeping mechanisms (Sterling, 2010). United Nations dispute resolution strategy involved negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement. Failure of parties to agree called for the use of force. However, the charter members who held the authority of operations limited the United Nations operations.

The five permanent members of the charter comprised of America, China, France, Britain, and Russia (Westerfield, 1996). The collective security system failed due to clarity in the definition of peace operations. The peacekeeping operations were subdivided into generations .The “first generation” peacekeeping was during the cold war, “second generation” peacekeeping was between the late 1980’s and the early 1990s and “third generation” peacekeeping after the late 1990s (Sterling, 2010). The scope of UN peace keeping operations were small during the second peace keeping operations due to factors that will be discussed later in this paper. However after the cold war, the number, scope, and length of such operations expanded to 20 new operations between 1989 and 1994.this paper majors on outlining the reasons that prompted the UN peacekeeping operations to expand after 1990.

With the culmination of the cold war, the nature of conflicts also changed. Originally, the UN peacekeeping operations were engrossed in solving interstate conflicts. There emerged a new different kind of conflicts that arose from weak institutions, secessionism, ethnic and tribal clashes and civil wars within states rather than between them (Lowe, Roberts, Welsh & Zaum, 2008). The rising intrastate conflicts and the explosion of frozen interstate conflicts of the cold war forced the UN to reform in a bid to adapt to these changes. Complex multidimensional peacekeeping emerged in reaction to the added demands of the vehement intrastate conflicts.

After the cold war, there was renewed hope that the UN peace operation systems would revive so that the UN would operate within the charter it had created during its establishment in 1945. Scholars, politicians, the media and the public had raised their expectations for the UN especially after the successful UN coalition in conquering Saddam’s attack on Kuwait (Brown, 1993). It was only natural for the UN to reform its peacekeeping strategies so it could match up to the widespread optimism.

There was also rising demand for the United Nations to undertake a wide variety of complex tasks ranging from structuring viable institutions of governance, to human rights monitoring, to security sector reform(Post Cold-War surge) as well as the demilitarization, disbandment and reintegration of prior fighters. This new task called for reforms that would equip the UN fully by improving its strategy and skills.

The shifting of the UN strategic context of peacekeeping in the 1990s prompted an equivalent Organizational modification to adapt complex multidimensional. These multidimensional operations were designed to safeguard the implementation of comprehensive peace covenants and help in placing foundations for maintaining peace. Under traditional peacekeeping, traditional peacekeepers failed to pursue political solutions, but operated to establish environments that were conducive for rivaling parties to form political settlements (Lowe, Roberts, Welsh & Zaum, 2008). There was an increase in complex clashes, which was not anticipated for initiated the need for fresh approaches, roles and skills, as well as resources and participants.

With a broader range of objectives came a demand a new multidimensional methodology that incorporated civilians, police and military participants. The backbone of peacekeeping operations increased from military to the administrators, economists, police officers, legal experts, de-miners, electoral observers, human rights monitors, civil affairs and governance experts, philanthropic workers, communications and public information experts (What is Peacekeeping, 2003). With all the shareholders, the UN had to reform and incorporates them in their operations. With this diversity in participants, it became acute to unify the efforts and commitments among the many participants. A wider partnership was reflected in the structure of all UN peacekeeping operations. There was need to avert the outbreak of conflict or the spillover of conflict across borders. With increased participation from diverse career experts, environmental, developmental and socioeconomic objectives were appended as the necessity for more comprehensive responses became increasingly apparent.

Another reason UN expanded its operation was in response to the rapidly increasing number of crises of countries and regions which called for the UN to expand its locations of operations (Lawson, 2012). In 1987, there were about 10,000 UN peacekeepers on missions around the world but this figure rose with the rise in the number of countries under conflicts. Since the conclusion of the Gulf War, the UN had launched fourteen new operations in Angola, Somalia, Mozambique, Georgia, Liberia, Rwanda, Haiti, and South Africa (Lawson, 2012). For the UN to tackle the increasing operations with the same limited resources it had, reforms were paramount to ensure the UN solved as many disputes as it could manage. However, these new operations were qualitatively and quantitatively different from the earlier UN peacekeeping operations during the Cold War hence need the UN to upgrade its systems in a bid to equip itself for these new challenges.

Another reason that prompted the UN to reform was the failure to restore peace in the Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia missions (Lawson, 2012). In Bosnia, UN peacekeepers were incapable of sojourning the ethnic clashes. The United Nations had further been denied the mandate and power to attack the aggressors. This crippled the operations. The United States was the initial pace setter but later had the problem to the UN. In addition, the United States denied the UN aid from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Lack of adequate funds to finance the operation made UN inadequate in its mission. Finally, when the conflict was in its critical stage and seemed uncontrollable, domestic concern had emerged and the United States initiated military action and negotiated for settlement (Brown, 1993). For many, the situation in Bosnia highlighted the certainty that besides legal minutiae at the United Nations, only the United States had the capability to execute peace in the world (Brown, 1993). Since the UN was the only reliable peace restoration movement at the time, these failures placed the UN under global scrutiny and criticism. The lengthy, intense conflicts in Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia, was a great show of the weaknesses of the UN for onlookers and the world at large (Brown, 1993). The bad notions and reputations placed on the UN especially in the united state politics of the time called for the UN secretary of the council to initiate reforms that commenced with the release of the Brahmin Report. The purpose of the report was to outline earlier peacekeeping missions, segregate flaws, and take steps to patch these mistakes all with an aim to ensure the efficiency of future peacekeeping missions (Jones, 2006).

The other cause of reforms in the UN during the second generation of peacekeeping was the freedom of superpower rivalry. During the early Cold War period, The UN was completely under the authority of the US and its Western allies. Colonization altered the previous balance between the GA and the SC is transforming the UN into a third world dominated organization However, this situation began to transform with the decolonization process in the 1960s.decolonisation freed the united nations from the binding constraints of the super-power rivalry into a period of unparalleled cooperation. The disbanding of the two Cold War superpowers USSR and the Soviet bloc reduced the distrust and the hostility between the two blocs. This bequeathed UN with the drive to perform effectively its role in the field of international peace and security. The renewed peace provided a serene environment for the UN to undertake its operations.

The increase in role of the UN from Stabilizing conflict situations after a cease-fire to post peace resolution tasks for example Leading states or territories through a transition to a stable government, based on democratic principles, good governance and financial development were the other purpose of the reforms (Cooper, 2008). There was a need for the Security Council to expand its peacekeeping responsibilities to incorporate immediate post-conflict peace building and create an environment for the parties to reach a lasting peace agreement (Cooper, 2008).

With the new roles, UN operations expanded to cover multinationals and multi-cultural aspects. The number of member states donating personnel and resources increased from the small groups of 26 traditional troop contributors to comprise over 100 countries (Lawson, 2012). A higher priority was bestowed to preparing immense numbers of civilian peacekeepers. This forced both the member states and the UN to develop reforms aimed to introduce on-call lists of personnel. The civilians also had to be trained and educated with requisite skills and knowledge they required to qualify for the numerous positions in operations worldwide.

Aside from the operational difficulties, the united nation expected since it expanded its operations to include a citizen of countries with many diverse cultures and customs, the number of risks also rose particularly for those countries located in areas of high risk (Lawson, 2012). With the risks emerged serious problems like numerous incidents of sexual misconduct, which demanded a higher sensitivity, focus and precedence to gender, humanitarian law and ethics. This called for the UN to make reforms that would include policies against such risks.

Another reason for UN reforms was the increase in risks among participants. The risks of participation in complex multidimensional operations also increased (Jones, 2006). Recruits working in severe war zones faced a greater risk from the occurrence of incidences like accidents and illness. The number of malicious acts that resulted in death of participants rose to 127 peacekeepers in 1993.the rises in mortality rates came at a time when the civilian police (CIVPOL) became indispensable in the majority of operations(Luck, 2009). With the increasing death came a necessity to the UN to attract and train persons from within the member countries national police amenities. Similarly, the UN began to recruit civilian peacekeepers from both the member states and the UN. There was the need for the United Nations to advance training and efforts to prepare the civilians for the field duty tasks ahead.

With increased industrialization, the issue on finances UN required to participate in its operations became a topic of concern. Although united nation operation are considered equivalent and proportional to the fund used to facilitate these operations, UN peacekeeping operations are not cheap because a large number of people must be prepared, transported or deployed in remote locations(What is Peacekeeping, 2003). In addition, they must be provided with housing, food and working equipment’s like automobiles to allow their mobility in the required areas. This entire basic requirement, the UN must provide hence rendering the peacekeeping operations very expensive. In the 1980s, the UN’s long-standing financial difficulties became acute, which was exacerbated by the reduction of the US’s contribution to its budget. There was the need for the UN to transform its peacekeeping operations from hefty and costly security oriented peacekeeping operations to lighter, peace building-oriented missions (Jones, 2006).

Another reason that called for the UN to reform was increased financial aid. Financial contributors even those with few exceptions on the United Nations, were willing to fund and sustain the United Nations operations (Jones, 2006). Previously, the UN financial burden had been shared by the wealthy member states like America, Britain, Canada, Spain, China and the Netherlands among others (Luck, 2009). UN member states of the Southern hemisphere, particularly Asia and Africa assumed replaced these dominant troop contributors to UN peacekeeping operations in a bid to secure a place among the permanent members of the Council. Japan currently contributes more than 12 percent of the budget while Germany’s annual contribution to the UN is larger than that of France and Britain (Jones, 2006).

United Nations reformed because as a response to the freedom it acquired after decolonization in the mid 1960s.the elimination of dominant powers and political influence had led to an increase in the number of members. The membership of the UN has increased sharply from 42 states to 185 states (Lawson, 2012). The new members called for a balance of power unlike in prior years where many people considered France and Great Britain as great powers. The new UN members also had Shared vision with members of the Security Council. There was a new willingness among the permanent members to co-operate for dealing with the crises, and carrying out their primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. In the late 1980s was newly emerging co-operation among the five permanent members of the Security Council (Brown, 1993). With new countries emerged with new roles in global affairs hence a need to reform.

The downfall of communism resulted to a brief Renaissance in the United Nations in the 1990s and pushed the UN to reform. For decades, Western leaders had blamed the Communists for the inability for UN action, so with the collapse, came a great expectation that the United Nations would be empowered to act. The diversity of the United Nations’ membership and the ambitious nature of its mandates make it highly likely that some constituencies will be seriously disappointed with its power-sharing arrangements and/or its accomplishments at any point in time. Persistent disappointment or feelings of disenfranchisement have often led to calls for reform.

Critics keep calling for reform, in part, because the United Nations has been so slow in delivering it (Luck, 2009). As the major powers hoped in San Francisco, formal institutional and structural reforms (Krasno, 2004) have proven hard to achieve with the UN system. The concerns about UN management and finance voiced by Congress in the late 1940s (Krasno, 2004) moreover, were echoed, a half-century later, in the late 1990s (Krasno, 2004).

After the end of the Cold War, growing co-operation in the peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations led to the questioning of the necessity of veto (Brown, 1993). For many people, in a world where co-operation was possible, and national troop contributions to UN military operations is voluntary, the reasons behind the veto became less obvious, and giving this right to new members getting harder to justify.

As the world changes, so do the politics of the United Nations and the priorities of its Member States. In looking to the United Nations to fulfill new mandates that exceed its capacities, influential non-governmental groups often look for structural innovations (Luck, 2009) or to the creation of new bodies to close the gap between expectations and capabilities. In both cases, proposals for reform usually follow (Krasno, 2004).

There was need to get rid of the paralyzing effect of the veto, regularly used by the superpowers against each other during the Cold War (Lawson, 2012). The veto privileges of five states nevertheless provoke contention, and it is widely perceived as having held the UN back from fulfilling its functions during the Cold War. Yet, the veto has merits as well as faults; it helped to get and keep the major powers within the UN framework when they would otherwise have either not joined in the first place or else deserted it; it may save the UN from damaging conflicts with its major members (Brown, 1993). This has contributed to a sense of responsibility and a habit of careful consultation among the permanent five (Brown, 1993), and it reduces the risk of acute discrepancies between power politics and the law of the UN Charter. In short, the veto can be viewed as one of several factors, which have made for the superiority of UN’s decision-making procedures over those of its predecessor, the League of Nations, and over many other regional organizations.

In conclusion, several reasons led to the increase in the number of members and expansion of operations of the UN before 1990. These reasons include the liberation of un from super power rivalry, the need to implement the 1940 suggested reforms, decolonization, change in nature of conflicts, high expectations, increase in number of countries under conflict, a demand for the un to diversify the nature of its tasks, reduced financial assistance that led adoption of cost effective military operations, multicultural operations that led to increased need to train civilians, the need to eliminate veto in a bid to restore balance, increased financial support, increased operational risks, failure of past missions and a change on the role of the united nations.

References

Brown, M. (1993). Ethnic Conflict and International Security. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Cooper, A. F. (2008). Regionalization and Global Governance: The Taming of Globalization?. London: Routledge.

Jones, B. ( 2006). Decolonizing International Relations. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield

Krasno, J. E. (2004). The United Nations: Confronting the Challenges of a Global Society. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Lawson, J. (2012). International Relations. Cambridge: Polity.

Lowe, V. Roberts, A. Welsh, J. & Zaum, D. (2008) The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945. New York. Oxford University Press.

Luck, E. (2009) Reforming the United Nations Lessons from a History. Retrieved November, 26, 2012, from HYPERLINK “http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&ved=0CDIQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdspace.cigilibrary.org%2Fjspui%2Fbitstream%2F123456789%2F5935%2F1%2FReforming%2520the%2520United%2520Nations%2520Lessons%2520from%2520a%2520History%2520in%2520Progress.pdf&ei=HamzUNDCJ6SA0AWWwIC4DQ&usg=AFQjCNG_DfGnG2ZS13zIhIJ2b4N77qkhDg&sig2=vwC110fxeV1tuievToZSQw” http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&ved=0CDIQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdspace.cigilibrary.org%2Fjspui%2Fbitstream%2F123456789%2F5935%2F1%2FReforming%2520the%2520United%2520Nations%2520Lessons%2520from%2520a%2520History%2520in%2520Progress.pdf&ei=HamzUNDCJ6SA0AWWwIC4DQ&usg=AFQjCNG_DfGnG2ZS13zIhIJ2b4N77qkhDg&sig2=vwC110fxeV1tuievToZSQw

Post Cold-War surge. (N.d.). Retrieved November 26, 2012, from HYPERLINK “http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/surge.shtml” http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/surge.shtml

Westerfield, D. (1996). War Powers: The President, the Congress, and the Question of War. Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Group.

What is Peacekeeping? (2003). Retrieved November 26, 2012, from HYPERLINK “http://www.scribd.com/doc/70052670/What-is-Peacekeeping-2003” http://www.scribd.com/doc/70052670/What-is-Peacekeeping-2003

Wilkinson, P. (2010). International Relations. New York: Sterling Publishing Company, Inc

United Nations Inability To Prevent Genocide

United Nations Inability To Prevent Genocide

Introduction

The world has known its fair share of wars and atrocities. In fact, the history of almost every other country in the globe is carved by wars, and in some cases genocide. However, never has the world experienced worse horrors as it did in the 20th century. The magnitude of violence has undergone evolution and even escalated, thanks to the advancement in technology. In the new war, civilians are on the receiving end, which is unlike in the past where wars pitted soldiers of different countries against one another. This new war was collectively given the term genocide by Raphael Lemkin in 1947 to underline the systematic and deliberate destruction, in part or whole, of a racial, national, religious or ethnic group. However, scholars have been having a hard time debating on what could sufficiently constitute a “part” so as to qualify the destruction as genocide (Andreopoulos, 13). Nevertheless, they note that it encompasses varied coordinated actions that aim at destroying the essential foundations of national groups’ life with the sole intention of annihilating these groups. Such a plan has the objective of disintegrating the social and political institutions of language, religion, culture, national feelings, as well as economic existence of these national groups, as well as the destruction of the personal liberty, dignity, lives, health and security of the people who belong to the groups. Raphael Lemkin stated that the genocide is not a new or contemporary phenomenon, rather it has been a fundamental component if civilization. However, he notes that the capacity of the international community more so the United Nations to prevent or intervene in it is relatively new. Scholars note that the prevention or even intervention in genocide was a fundamental component during the formation of the United Nations. Resolution 96 (1) of the United Nations established that the United Nations would prevent, as well as punish genocide. In addition, this clause was a resolution of the member nations to draft the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. It is well understood that, during the cold war years, the United Nations could do nothing as it was entangled in the cold war politics. However, it is worth noting that the Security Council of the UN incorporates the capacity to implement the necessary measures so as to maintain security and peace in the international community. Questions emerge on whether international bodies in general and especially the United Nations (UN) are capable of preventing or even stoping the occurence of genocide. As varied scholars and observers note, the United Nations has been incredibly unable to intervene and stop the occurrence of genocide (Andreopoulos, 34). Volumes of literature have been written to this effect reviewing what went wrong in past genocides, as well as the capacity or the ability of the United Nations to intervene and prevent genocides. While many scholars acknowledge that the United Nations stands out as the best hope for intervention and prevention of genocide, there is widespread agreement that the international body is unable to prevent or intervene in genocides.

Thesis statement: The United Nations is incapable of intervening or preventing genocides.

Since the formation of the United Nations in 1945 after the World War II, there have occurred a total of 55 genocides and political wars, which have claimed the lives of more than 75 people. This is undoubtedly more than has been claimed by wars. The United Nations took steps to prevent and punish perpetrators of genocide during the Genocide Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Organizers of Genocide. The Genocide Convention was arguably the most fundamental step that the United Nations took in an effort to prevent the occurrence of genocide or guide its intervention during genocide. It defined the term genocide and categorized it as a crime in international law, with the parties pledging to prevent, as well as punish it. Punishment would be meted on perpetrators, conspirers, as well as individuals who incite, attempt to or even exhibit complicity in genocide, irrespective of their position in the society. Suspects of such crimes, according to the Genocide Convention, were to undergo trial by a competent tribunal set up in the country where they carried out the acts or even by an international penal tribunal that has jurisdiction (http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/UN-GENO.asp). These crimes were not to be categorized as political crimes, according to the Genocide Convention. On the same note, it is worth noting that the United Nations, via the Security Council can kick up varied measures in an effort to maintain international peace and stability.

While the United Nations may have these powers, it is worth noting that it does not incorporate a standing army. This international body does not constitute a military organization. The willingness and legitimacy of deploying missions or troops that would prevent the occurrence of conflict has its roots in the universal membership, the Security Council, as well as the UN Charter. While this may be the case, it is noteworthy that the deficiency of a standing army means that the UN’s capacity to intervene in conflicts is incredibly hampered. This is because nations take time before they can agree on risking the lives of their people, the financiers of such efforts, or even who would be leading the charge. This was seen in the case of Rwandan genocide in April 1994. As General Dallaire in the Carnegie Report, as few as 5000 troops could have been enough to prevent the occurrence of genocide in Rwanda (Dorn and Matloff, 23). It is noted that General Dallaire had prior information about the arming and training of Hutu militia in weaponry so that they can engage in the extermination and annihilation of their Tutsi tribesmen, as well as Hutu moderates. Unfortunately, the UN peacekeepers were poorly equipped and had, in fact, had some of them withdrawn from the country. As the Carnegie Report notes, countries were reluctant to commit their peacekeepers to the provision of support for the offensive force that General Dallaire was vouching for, for varied reasons. The United States was unwilling to commit its soldier to this cause after the Somalia incident, especially considering the likely casualty levels, as well as the political impact of such actions on the involved countries (Dorn and Matloff, 24). Belgium, on the other hand, had resolved to withdraw its soldiers from Rwanda after losing 10 of them. Other key countries such as Canada and France were also unwilling to send their soldiers as it was understood that irrespective of their edge in firepower, they would still be likely to lose a number of their troops, losses that few countries were willing to tolerate. In essence, despite the fact that the United Nations could call for such intervention, its lack of standing military means that it still has to rely on countries especially major powers, which immensely undermines its capacity to intervene or prevent genocide.

On the same note, as much as the UN is quite operational, its peace operations do not have proper equipment for the prevention of or even intervention in large-scale violence propagated against civilians. This equipment is in terms of personnel, finance, as well as arms. As noted earlier, the UN is unable to organize, deploy, as well as manage military operations in a comprehensive and rapid manner. Even in instances where the United Nations manages to convince countries to deploy some of their troops, scholars note that the troops are quite different as far as their training is concerned, or even the equipment that they are using in such missions (Dorn and Matloff, 25). These factors limit the capacity of the missions to function in the hostile environments. Moreover, Ludlow (17) notes that the United Nations troops called in to Rwanda had been advised to use force only in self defense and not to take any enforcement action. This stipulation that emphasizes on self defense during, according to Ludlow  (23), is a direct avoidance at stipulating outright intervention in the genocide that was taking place.

In addition, as much as the United Nations may be an international entity and even incorporate some avenues of preventing or at least intervening in genocides, it is not a truly independent entity. Gold (35) notes that the United Nations’ Security Council addresses the political motives, as well as strategic interests of the permanent members especially in humanitarian intervention. He cites the case of Kuwaiti, which the Security Council was quick to protect thanks to their oil, unlike the case of  Rwandan genocide where the Security Council took time before declaring it “genocide” or even calling for military intervention as Rwanda does not have as many resources (Gold, 36). These sentiments are also echoed by Farrell (13) who christens the United Nations as an agency or a large bureaucracy that is made up of numerous, jealously-guarded fiefdoms, with special interest groups and an extended hierarchy of stakeholders dominating each of the fiefdoms. According to Farrell, the interest groups have a claim to the UN’s resources, which is determined by a sophisticated set of agency and power relationships rather that the principles of subsidiarity and solidarity (17). In essence, as much as the United Nations may have varied strategies that it can use to intervene or prevent genocide, it still suffers from lack of independence as its resources or even its intervention efforts are controlled by the special interest groups, as well as the five permanent members. This lack of autonomy and total control was also shown in Rwanda. As Kentish (16) notes, General Romeo Dallaire had recommended that he be allowed to jam the broadcasting stations as they were being used to incite the Hutu against the Tutsi, as well as call for their extermination. However, the United States declined this request stating that such an option or action would be a breach of constitutional commitment to free speech (Kentish 16). As (Krain, 6) notes, the Security Council’s authority is mostly vetoed against by the powerful nations especially when their interests are not met, thereby crippling the institution’s capacity. This raises questions about the independence or autonomous nature of the institution, which evidently shows that as much as it has the power to take varied measures, it does not have the capacity to undertake them without the authority or at least the assistance of certain countries.

Moreover, the very nature of the United Nations cripples its ability to intervene in or prevent the occurrence of genocides. This is especially considering that the member states are considered autonomous and sovereign. Genocide is not a war that pits nations against each other, rather it comes in the form of civil war or an internal affair. As Merkel (16) notes, the United Nations was established in an effort to continue cooperation and communication between nations rather than solve world problems more so within nations. In essence, the creation of the United Nations has, therefore, seen a decrease in wars between nations with civil wars increasing tremendously. Its activities are usually limited to those actions that are not seen as a violation of the sovereignty of the countries involved (Totten and Bartrop, 23). This explains why its intervention in the Rwandan genocide was limited to humanitarian intervention, services that aimed at assisting civilian populations that may not be taking part in the conflict. In most cases, however, humanitarian assistance comes short of preventing the occurrence of genocide as seen in the case of Rwanda. The killing of the ten soldiers from Belgium may have resulted from the fact that the soldiers were not allowed to use force unless they were defending themselves. The use of force, however, comes as a necessity in the case of genocide as shown by the French soldiers who intervened in the genocide and helped in halting and even eliminating it (Totten and Bartrop, 26). Unfortunately, the United Nations is recognized as a neutral institution, a feature that would be considerably watered down if it involved itself in a country’s local politics as would be the case in case of a forceful, military intervention.

However, Totten and Bartrop (26) opine that the United Nations should not be entirely blamed for the mistakes that have been done in the past in relation to Kosovo, Kuwaiti and Rwanda. Instead, they lay the blame on other countries and especially the key powers noting that they veto the Security Council’s authority in instances where they feel that their interests are not threatened. They note that, in the case of Rwanda, the only successful intervention was by the French soldiers, an operation that was known as Operation Turquoise (Totten and Bartrop, 27). This was an indication that the genocide could have been prevented if only the powerful countries had the political will to do it. It is noteworthy that the French was only intervening due to their vested interests in the country. While this assertion abdicates the UN from blame, it also raises questions on its ability to act on its own and serves as a confirmation as to its inability to prevent or intervene in such atrocities.

In conclusion, there have been quite a large number of genocides in the contemporary human society. This has been worsened by technological innovation, which has taken warfare to an entirely new level. However, since the formation of the United Nations, there has been a decrease in wars between nations but an increase in wars within nations. This has taken the form of genocide, defined as the deliberate annihilation and extermination of a certain group of people distinguished by tribe, religion, color, language and culture among other features. Questions have arisen on whether the U.N has the capacity to prevent and intervene in genocides. It is evident that the United Nations has been ineffective in doing this. As much as this international body has various tools that it could use to prevent or intervene in genocides, it faces some structural and institutional obstacles. It does not have a standing army, in which case even its humanitarian efforts are deeply hindered. In addition, it seems to be captive of varied major countries in which case its involved in the power play of these countries. The resources that it has at its disposal are determined by the powerful nations, which almost always act only if their interests are met. In addition, the formation of the United Nations was based on the need for international peace, with its legitimacy being derived from its ability to remain neutral. This image is likely to be eliminated in case it involves itself in the local politics of a country as envisioned by genocide. There are also issues of a country’s sovereignty which cannot be violated especially for independent countries. In addition, it does not have a standard approach to genocide in which case even in instances where it chooses to intervene, it takes too long due to logistics on who would provide the troops, financing or leadership during a military intervention. In essence, despite its capacity to instigate diplomatic, economic, military and political sanctions, the United Nations is incapable of preventing or intervening sufficiently in genocides.

Annotated Bibliography

Modern History Sourcebook: UN Resolution 260, 1948 – On Genocide: CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE. United Nations Treaties Series. No. 1021, vol. 78 (1951), p. 277. Retrieved 23rd January 2013 from HYPERLINK “http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/UN-GENO.asp” http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/UN-GENO.asp

This internet source provides outlines of the provisions of the United Nations in Geneva Conventions. It also outlines the resolutions that the countries that were members of the United Nations made pertaining to genocide and defines the actions that would be termed as genocide.

Totten, Samuel and Bartrop, Paul R. The United Nations and genocide: Prevention, intervention, and prosecution. Human Rights Review July–September 2004, Volume 5, Issue 4, pp 8-31

The writers note that the United Nations, until recently, has not come close to fulfilling its mandate, which is articulated or spelt out in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. In fact, it has rarely implemented Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter so as to physically intervene in order to stop conflicts or counter the threats to peace. Totten and Bartrop opine that the United Nations has mainly focused on balancing the interests of the great powers that control it.

Gold, Dore. Tower of Babble: How the United Nations Has Fueled Global Chaos. New York: Three Rivers Press, 2005. Print

Gold, in this book criticizes the United Nations for its moral relativism. He examines why the United Nations has not been intervening and blames the major powers who he says hold the organization captive. He accuses the council of addressing only the political motives and strategic interests of its five permanent members more so during humanitarian interventions. He notes, for instance, that the council protected the Kuwaitis due to their oil, while giving poor protection to the resource-poor Rwandans during the 1994 genocide.

Ludlow, D.R.L Humanitarian Intervention and the Rwandan Genocide. Journal of conflict Studies. Volume XIX, No. 1 Spring 1999. Print

Ludlow also examines the capacity of the United Nations to intervene or prevent genocide with his main focus being the Rwandan genocide of 1994. He states that the intervention of the United Nations was inadequate and restricted to humanitarian intervention. This resource also chronicles the events of the genocide, outlining the efforts that the UN made before, during and after the genocide and bringing to the fore the failing of the institution.

Kentish, Lucy. ‘Genocide Prevention in the Modern Setting: Theory versus Practice’. Internet Journal of Criminology, 2011. Print

Kentish examines the various genocides that have occurred in the contemporary world, not to mention the role that the United Nations has played in preventing their occurrence or even halting them. The journal outlines the reasons and the occurrence of genocides in Serbia and Rwanda among other countries. It outlines the failings of the United Nations during the Rwandan genocide examining their basis or reason.

Merkel, Bernard-Alexandre. The Rwandan Genocide: The Guilty Bystanders. E-international relations, 2010. Retrieved 23rd January 2013 from HYPERLINK “http://www.e-ir.info/2010/01/14/the-rwandan-genocide-the-guilty-bystanders/” http://www.e-ir.info/2010/01/14/the-rwandan-genocide-the-guilty-bystanders/

This resource examines the inability of the United Nations to intervene in case of genocides through the lens of Rwandan genocide. He examines why the nature of the United Nations hinders it from fulfilling its mandate. While the institution may be credited with reducing wars between nations, it is unable to reduce civil wars or even genocides mainly because these are internal wars.

Farrell, Michael L. The Genocide in Rwanda and the Structural Limitations of the Secular Human Rights Movement. Social Justice Review VOL. 100, No. 11-12 November-December, 2009. Print

The author does acknowledge that the United Nations and the entire international community are incapable of intervening or preventing genocides. The author christens the United Nations as an agency or the powerful nations, in which case it is entangled in doing their bidding. The author brings to the fore the power relations that affect the ability of the institution to execute its duties, as well as its manpower limitations.

Krain, Mathew. Atrocity Interrupted: How Intervention Mandate, Magnitude and Mission Sponsor Affect the Severity of Genocide or Politicide. International Studies Association, San Diego, California, 2006. Print

Krain acknowledges that the United Nations occupies an advantaged position that states do not have as far as intervention in genocides is concerned. He examines why the United Nations is better placed to intervene than states, as well as the limitations that it faces in executing such duties. He cites administrative limitations, lack of financial assistance, bureaucratic politics and the different interests of countries among others as the key reasons. He notes that the United Nations is still a captive of its member states especially powerful countries whose bidding it tries to balance (6).

Dorn, A. Walter and Matloff, Jonathan. Preventing the Bloodbath: Could the UN have Predicted and Prevented the Rwandan Genocide? The Journal of Conflict Studies. Volume XX, No. 1 Spring 2000

This resource examines the capability of the United Nations to stop genocide with specific focus on the Rwandan case. It chronicles the occurrence of the Rwandan genocide, as well as how the UN peacekeepers handled it. It also examines incorporates some information on the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide especially the Carnegie Report.

Works cited

Andreopoulos, George J. Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions. Philadelphia, Pa: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1997. Print.

Totten, Samuel and Bartrop, Paul R. The United Nations and genocide: Prevention, intervention, and prosecution. Human Rights Review July–September 2004, Volume 5, Issue 4, pp 8-31

Gold, Dore. Tower of Babble: How the United Nations Has Fueled Global Chaos. New York: Three Rivers Press, 2005. Print

Ludlow, D.R.L Humanitarian Intervention and the Rwandan Genocide. Journal of conflict Studies. Volume XIX, No. 1 Spring 1999. Print

Kentish, Lucy. ‘Genocide Prevention in the Modern Setting: Theory versus Practice’. Internet Journal of Criminology, 2011. Print

Merkel, Bernard-Alexandre. The Rwandan Genocide: The Guilty Bystanders. E-international relations, 2010. Retrieved 23rd January 2013 from HYPERLINK “http://www.e-ir.info/2010/01/14/the-rwandan-genocide-the-guilty-bystanders/” http://www.e-ir.info/2010/01/14/the-rwandan-genocide-the-guilty-bystanders/

Farrell, Michael L. The Genocide in Rwanda and the Structural Limitations of the Secular Human Rights Movement. Social Justice Review VOL. 100, No. 11-12 November-December, 2009. Print

Dorn, A. Walter and Matloff, Jonathan. Preventing the Bloodbath: Could the UN have Predicted and Prevented the Rwandan Genocide? The Journal of Conflict Studies. Volume XX, No. 1 Spring 2000

Krain, Mathew. Atrocity Interrupted: How Intervention Mandate, Magnitude and Mission Sponsor Affect the Severity of Genocide or Politicide. International Studies Association, San Diego, California, 2006. Print